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ABSTRACT 
Effectively implementing a homeland security program within police agencies labeled 
“non-major” in the United States is a challenge that requires different approaches from 
those that the large, or “major” departments employ. This research provides critical 
analysis leading to recommendations on how this important implementation can be 
accomplished without increasing the budget or personnel requirements within a given 
agency. Using a rigorous policy analytical framework and a representative case study 
approach, the findings coordinate and suggest how this process can fit into an agency’s 
plan to protect and respond to a community while successfully merging new and existing 
homeland security programs. The research finds that within a non-major police agency, 
the critical nodes for implementing effective homeland security hinge on an integrated 
leadership, communication and data collection synergy that leaders of these non-major 
departments can be taught and implement. This research contributes to the growing 
literature seeking to merge traditional law enforcement responsibilities with emerging 
homeland security requirements more effectively.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Lord, I ask for courage—Courage to face and conquer my own fears. . . 
Courage to take me where others will not go. I ask for strength-Strength of 
body to protect others…Strength of spirit to lead others. I ask for 
dedication-Dedication to my job to do it well. Dedication to my 
community to keep it safe. Give me Lord, concern- Concern for others 
who trust me… And compassion for those who need me. . . And, please, 
Lord, through it all, be at my side.  
    A Police Officer’s Prayer-Author Unknown 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the responsibilities of local law 
enforcement leaders changed overnight. The terrorist attacks forced a different level of 
thinking required by law enforcement leaders to keep their communities safe. Law 
enforcement leaders now must concern themselves with how they can better prepare their 
police departments and community from the threat of terrorism. Law enforcement leaders 
should consider if their leadership ability will adequately meet the necessary skills in 
meeting these expectations. The threat of street level criminals impacting the 
community’s safety is now interchangeable with the reality that terrorists are willing and 
capable of inflicting a much larger scale of devastation. Are law enforcement leaders 
capable of leading the community from a state of shock and fear to a state of prevention, 
recovery, or resilience if or when a terrorist attack occurs in their community?  
Since 9/11, law enforcement agencies continue to try to discern how their 
agencies can add homeland security practices to the roles in which they already provide 
within their communities. One of the challenges that continue to face smaller police 
agencies across the nation is the fact that police departments not classified as a “major” 
police department, do not receive federal funding to start or sustain homeland security 
programs. If money is not available to non-major law enforcement agencies, alternative 
strategies must be considered to implement and sustain new programs. Non-major police 
departments typically do not have the number of police officers found within local police 
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departments considered “major.” Major police departments can often shift personnel 
resources within the organization to start new programs or alter policing strategies. 
Smaller agencies do not have this luxury and often cannot start new programs unless the 
program includes federal grant money for the hiring of new officers. It is unreasonable to 
suggest or recommend that every local police department receive federal funding for 
homeland security. This sentiment does not dismiss the fact that citizens expect their 
police departments to provide a safe and secure community regardless of how the 
department accomplishes the mission.  
The majority of police departments in the United States have 10 officers or less. If 
these smaller police agencies decide that they want to perform homeland security 
practices within their jurisdictions, they must find a way to do so without disrupting 
current services provided to the community. Since it is common for non-major law 
enforcement agencies to adopt policing strategies used by major police agencies, which 
homeland security strategies being conducted by the major police departments can be 
implemented by non-major law enforcement agencies using existing resources available 
to them? Can this philosophy be applied to increase the security of non-major policing 
communities? 
According to the Major Cities Chiefs Organization website, a “major” police 
department is categorized by the following criteria. 
Membership in the Major Cities Chiefs is designed to reflect the public 
safety needs and unique crime problems of the largest policing agencies in 
the United States and Canada. Police executives who meet one of the 
following criteria are eligible for membership: 
A.  “Major cities” means (a) the largest 50 cities in the United States 
based on population as determined by the latest annual census 
update, and (b) the largest 7 cities in Canada based on population 
as determined by the latest annual census update.  
B.  “Major metropolitan areas” means those metropolitan areas with a 
residential population of at least 1. 5 million, and whose largest 
law enforcement agency is comprised of at least 1,000 sworn law 
enforcement officers. (Major Cities Chiefs Police Police 
Organization, 2011, About Section) 
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A study initiated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police is underway 
to determine the definition of a police department often overlooked by the federal 
government in terms of funding support for programs, such as homeland security 
initiatives (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, any 
municipal law enforcement agency that does not receive federal funding to support 
homeland security programs is considered a “non-major” law enforcement agency and 
labeled as non-major. Non-major law enforcement agencies that do not receive federal or 
state funding to initiate a homeland security program are left with few options in how 
their agencies can participate in the nation’s homeland security efforts. Many of these 
agencies are experiencing reductions in their budgets and personnel while facing 
increasing incidents of violent crime and disorder within their community. In 2006, the 
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) concluded the following: 
Local law enforcement is struggling with its new role and responsibilities 
in handling counterterrorism issues while maintaining its crime prevention 
and control duties. As budgets for traditional crime control have been 
tightened, law enforcement faces significant increases in the type and 
volume of service it must provide to keep citizens safe from violence and 
from vague, ongoing terrorist threat. Local law enforcement is working to 
be included in state homeland security plans and competing for funds with 
other first responders, all while developing or coordinating new homeland 
security efforts such as creating intelligence functions that will aid in 
terrorism prevention. (Davies, Plotkin, Filler, Flynn, Foresman, Litzinger, 
McCarthy, & Wiseman, 2005, p. 42) 
The statement released from PERF in 2006 remains true today for most local law 
enforcement agencies across the nation. Federal funding is minimal and primarily 
allocated for major police agencies. Recognizing the importance of this issue, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recently announced the 
organization’s support for the National Criminal Justice Commission Act (S. 714) 
(Carroll, 2011). The National Criminal Justice Commission Act is intended to analyze 
law enforcement challenges and provide recommendations for changes.  
Local law enforcement agencies cannot rely on pending legislation to determine 
strategies on how their agencies can participate in the nations homeland security efforts. 
With the successful passage of this legislation, it may take several years to determine if 
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this initiative provides answers to the current local law enforcement dilemma. According 
to a 2010 report released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the nation’s 
homeland security success depends largely on the ability of local and state government 
entities ability to execute the core homeland security mission activities (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). Since the missions are much broader than 
DHS is capable of executing, it is imperative non-major police agencies become 
involved.  
Based upon conversations with several non-major law enforcement police chiefs, 
a review of other non-major law enforcement agencies, and a search of numerous 
databases, no existing models or strategies are available for non-major law enforcement 
agencies to implement that would strengthen their homeland security efforts. Law 
enforcement leaders, within non-major law enforcement agencies, are facing shrinking 
budgets, personnel shortages, and emerging problems with street level crimes and 
disorder in their communities. These agencies do not have answers on how their 
organizations can effectively deploy homeland security strategies without increasing the 
number of employees, which directly affects the department’s budget allocation.  
In summary, the problem this research addresses is a need to provide non-major 
law enforcement executives with a strategy to enable the implementation of homeland 
security practices that consider budget and personnel limitations.  
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
What strategies can non-major law enforcement agencies implement to strengthen 
America’s homeland security using the organizations current manpower and budget 
allocation to prevent future terrorist attacks in the United States? 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to determine what, if any, strategies non-
major law enforcement agencies can implement to participate in homeland security using 
their current resources to prevent future terrorist attacks within the United States. This 
analysis of homeland security literature is closely examined for information that 
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establishes responsibilities placed upon non-major municipal law enforcement agencies 
within homeland security. Another purpose of this literature review is to provide the 
researcher and the reader with an understanding on what homeland security strategies are 
occurring within the United States and abroad. The purpose of this review is then to use 
this information to determine how these practices can be implemented in police agencies 
concerned they do not have the personnel resources or budget to accomplish similar 
strategies. Thus, the primary goal was to locate a single source strategy document that a 
police chief of a non-major agency can implement within the respective agency without 
adding personnel or a significant increase to the organization’s budget.  
This literature review is grouped into two categories. The first category includes 
federal government publications, national strategies and other national documents. The 
purpose of reviewing federal publications is to determine what, if any, strategies or 
programs the national government mandates for local law enforcement agencies. If 
national strategies or programs already exist, local law enforcement agencies may utilize 
federal funding to help support or sustain future programs. Another advantage of 
determining if existing federal guidelines are already established for local police agencies 
to follow, is maintaining a certain element of consistency within the various local law 
enforcement agencies across the nation on how the programs are conducted and reported. 
The second category consists of information provided by nationally recognized law 
enforcement organizations, such as the IACP and PERF. Local law enforcement agencies 
rely heavily on these organizations to provide leadership in addressing problems or 
concerns that face local police agencies. The nationally recognized law enforcement 
organizations provide analysis of problems local police agencies face and then provide 
alternative solutions that departments can adopt to serve their agency and community 
alike better.  
After conducting this process, the review failed to provide a single source 
document that included a clear, concise strategy document for non-major police chiefs to 
engage their officers and community successfully towards a terrorism prevention 
strategy. At best, several of the documents served as a general guideline; however, a  
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police chief would need to dedicate time and energy to understand and formulate specific 
homeland security strategies that do not require adding personnel or without asking for 
additional funds to support programs.  
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report states, “State, local, tribal, 
and territorial governments are on the front lines of our efforts to secure our homeland, 
and are the first responders to incidents of all types. A coordinated approach that 
promotes unity of effort will provide the strongest foundation for the homeland security’s 
enterprise’s efforts to combat current, emerging, and future threats to the homeland. To 
achieve unity of effort, partners will need clearly defined roles and responsibilities” 
(United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). Prevention is a common word 
found in homeland security national strategies. The Quadrennial report notes the 
“cornerstone” of the nation’s homeland security efforts is directly related to “prevention” 
efforts (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). It is the responsibility 
of non-major police departments to derive a plan to insure public safety no matter the 
cost or considerations of personnel resources. However, like most agencies, large or 
small, budgets define police agencies and what police services are provided. Thus, non-
major police departments must be creative and resourceful to sustain public security and 
safety. Terrorists can reside or target any community, regardless of its size or population.  
1.  Professional Law Enforcement Organizations Documents—Defining 
Non-Major Municipal Law Enforcement Agency 
Within the selected government and professional organization publications 
reviewed, only one document, authored by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, attempted to define a non-major law enforcement agency and the distinct 
differences between smaller and larger agencies. The U.S. Department of Justice 
published the report in collaboration with the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police in March 2010. Interestingly, the committee members assigned to the policy 
research group did not agree on a single definition of a non-major police agency (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2010).  
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The definition on how a police agency is categorized is significant based upon the 
future funding considerations of the federal government. For example, the Independence 
Missouri Police Department is not considered a “major” police department due to 
population and number of commissioned officers. The City of Independence borders the 
city limits of Kansas City, Missouri and frequently experiences the same types of crimes 
committed by the same offenders. Due to the size differences of the organizations, the 
Kansas City Missouri Police Department staffing allows for the formation of various 
homeland security units that the City of Independence is unable to staff, such as the 
Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning fusion center. Unless cities similar to the City of 
Independence, Missouri receive federal funding to implement homeland security 
programs, these agencies are forced to identify and implement programs using current 
personnel resources and funding.  
2.  National Strategy Documents 
The role of local law enforcement agencies on matters of national security cannot 
be underestimated. Local law enforcement serves as the front line of defense for the 
nation (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005). Local law enforcement provides police 
officers in virtually every community found within this nation, and as history proves, 
terrorists have lived in smaller communities and targeted larger, adjacent communities as 
did several of the 9/11 hijackers who resided in California prior to executing the terror 
plots. It is imperative that every non-major law enforcement agency determine how it can 
implement strategies to strengthen homeland security within its communities to prevent 
future acts of terrorism.  
When determining the homeland security role of local police, it is important to 
determine why local law enforcement leaders look to the federal government for these 
answers. Since the first national strategy was published in 2002, the federal government 
has taken a leadership role in forming a national homeland security program. For 
example, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states, “While law 
enforcement agencies will continue to investigate and prosecute criminal activity, they 
should now assign priority to preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the 
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United States” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. xi). The problem with this 
statement is that the federal government provides no guidance or funding to ensure that 
this strategy is successful. While each law enforcement agency is different, it must first 
insure that basic police services are met before addressing larger homeland security 
issues.  
Following the 2002 report, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security was 
released. As noted in this report, the purpose of the 2007 Strategy is to, “guide, organize, 
and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts” (Office of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 
1). Again, this strategy states the overall goal; however, the strategy once again fails to 
provide specific guidance on how non-major local law enforcement agencies meet these 
expectations within their budget and personnel resources.  
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Strategy released in 2010, states, “The 
purpose of this QHSR is to outline the strategic framework to guide the activities of 
participants in homeland security toward a common end” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010b, p. iii). Without specific strategies and outside funding 
sources, non-major law enforcement agencies are again left with the problem of 
determining what, if any, strategies can be accomplished with existing resources and 
funding to prevent future terrorist attacks.  
The 2002, 2007, and the 2010 national strategy reports provide local law 
enforcement agencies with broad, visionary goals to establish a nationwide homeland 
security strategy. The strategies fail to provide non-major municipal law enforcement 
agencies with any suggestions or specific strategies on how they can successfully 
implement homeland security practices within their organizations to meet these 
objectives. When the federal government issues a national strategy, the government needs 
to provide additional information on how law enforcement agencies can achieve the 
strategies. If the federal government leads the homeland security strategy of the nation, 
then it makes logical sense that federal documents should be created to assist agencies in 




agencies into one category—local. Local law enforcement agencies across the nation 
differ in many facets; number of officers, budget allocation including grant assistance, 
and internal and external challenges facing the organization.  
The National Response Framework (NRF) released in 2008, replaces the former 
National Response Plan (NRP). The NRF boasts the many improvements made in the 
national response structures since the issuance of the NRP (Office of Homeland Security, 
2008). The NRF report is a start in providing guiding principles for local law 
enforcement to establish a unified national “response” to disasters; however, this report 
fails to consider “how” local police agencies implement these principles. The National 
NRF report is based solely on “response” guidelines. Therefore, the report fails to 
provide an established “prevention” guideline for non-major police agencies so that they 
fully understand their role in the homeland security effort.  
It might be expected to find guidance from the National Security Strategy (NSS) 
for non-major municipal law enforcement to help define its role in homeland security. 
The latest NSS report, published May of 2010, states, “To prevent acts of terrorism on 
American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland 
security capabilities” (The White House, 2010, p. 20).  
The NSS report encourages the various levels of law enforcement to improve 
intelligence and communications using Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) and fusion 
centers. However, the report fails to specify additional prevention strategies and how 
these fit into the non-major police agency role of homeland security.  
In July 2010, the federal government released the Bottom–Up Review Report 
(BUR) of the nation’s homeland security strategy. When speaking on strengthening 
DHS’s mission areas in this report, improving DHS operations and management, and 
increasing DHS accountability, Secretary Janet Napolitano states, “The BUR will serve 
as a road map for these questions. First and foremost, it provides direction for reinforcing 
the cornerstone of homeland security: preventing terrorism” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010a, p. iv). Non-major police agencies will not find answers about 
how they can implement homeland security policies and achieve homeland security goals 
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using existing resources within this report. The BUR is similar to the preceding 
Quadrennial report, in that it provided broad national strategies but failed to provide non-
major law enforcement agencies with strategies that can be implemented without 
increasing personnel or budgets.  
If the nation desires to develop a strategy that unifies efforts and builds 
collaboration between the community and the various agencies, single source easily 
understood documents must be readily available to decision makers. Law enforcement 
executives that lack experience within the homeland security field may be more inclined 
to implement programs if single source documents are available for their review. The 
materials addressed during this literature review were found to be long, comprehensive, 
and lacking specific details needed to ensure that local law enforcement could participate 
in homeland security without increasing manpower or funding within the organizations.  
3.  Professional Law Enforcement Organizations Documents 
Professional law enforcement organizations, such as IACP and PERF, routinely 
publish studies that analyze the challenges facing law enforcement agencies. The IACP is 
a preeminent leader for law enforcement agencies across the nation. In a 2008 article, 
former IACP President Ronald Ruecker stated, “The prevention of terrorist attacks must 
be viewed as the paramount priority in any national, state, tribal, or local homeland 
security strategy. Unfortunately, to date, the vast majority of federal homeland security 
efforts have focused on increasing national capabilities to respond to and recover from a 
terrorist attack.” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2008, p. 6). Since federal 
funding is being used for the prevention and response aspect, it is essential that non-
major law enforcement agencies look within to build a framework that will provide its 
community with a strategic approach to the growing threat of terrorism.  
In 2003, PERF released the first of six publications entitled, Protecting Your 
Community from Terrorism (Murphy, Plotkin, Flynn, Perlov, Stafford, & Stephens, 
2003). Combined, these volumes provide a comprehensive summary of homeland 
security issues facing municipal law enforcement agencies across the nation. The six 
volumes provide police executives a broad range of information concerning homeland 
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security issues that local law enforcement agencies should consider when developing a 
homeland security plan. Since the publications cover a multitude of homeland security 
topics, the information is broad and serves, at best, a guide for police executives. 
Although these publications provide police executives within the non-major law 
enforcement agencies a broad knowledge of homeland security strategies, additional 
information is required for these executives to determine how their organizations can 
implement homeland security policies and achieve homeland security goals using 
existing resources. These publications fail to provide a single source document that a 
non-major law enforcement executive can read and understand what it is possible to do 
today to implement homeland security strategies without increasing their budgets, 
negatively impacting basic police services, or increasing manpower to implement 
strategies.  
This analysis shows that inadequate strategic guidance exists for non-major law 
enforcement agencies to implement at all levels of review. Furthermore, this literature 
review demonstrates that non-major law enforcement executives across the nation do not 
have a single source strategy document that demonstrates what they can do without 
negatively affecting the organizations budget and what can be accomplished with their 
current personnel resources. Subsequently, non-major law enforcement executives may 
be missing the necessary strategies to increase participation in the nation’s homeland 
security practices. Law enforcement executives who look at national strategies to provide 
answers will find only general principles that do not consider how programs impact 
personnel resources or limited budgets. At best, the national strategies provide a 
framework for agencies to use in establishing overall homeland security goals. While the 
national strategies provide the overarching goals, they lack specific plans or details on 
how to achieve the goals. Establishing specific strategies that can be shared by all police 
agencies, regardless of their size, is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. A “one-size” fit 
all approach is very difficult because local police agencies are so different. Different 




operations of non-major law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement executives must 
decide what police services can be offered to the community within specific budgets and 
available personnel resources.  
The professional law enforcement organizations offer guiding principles for law 
enforcement executives; however, they also find it difficult to find a “one-size” fits all 
answer in determining how non-major law enforcement agencies can effectively 
implement homeland security practices. While the professional organizations support 
homeland security programs, they have yet to provide specific information on how this 
can be accomplished. The decision on what strategies to implement and how to 
implement them is left to the chiefs of police of non-major law enforcement agencies. 
The inability of the International Association of Chiefs of Police’s committee to agree on 
the definition of what a mid-size police agency demonstrates the difficulty in determining 
the differences found within local law enforcement agencies. Identifying and articulating 
specific homeland security practices for implementation by these organizations must 
continue as new initiatives are developed.  
As previously stated, professional organizations, such as the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, are attempting to identify the different size 
classifications of local law enforcement agencies. This effort will help identify how the 
agency size and location can create different problems so that potential solutions can be 
sought. No specific guidelines have been located in this review to address what strategies 
non-major law enforcement agencies should implement to strengthen America’s 
homeland security using current manpower and budget allocations.  
Several other concerns were identified during the literature reviews relevant to the 
successful implementation of strategies within non-major law enforcement agencies. 
• The lack of leadership training for current and future homeland security 
leaders now facing the threat of terrorism within their communities 
• Following a large scale terrorism attack, first responders and citizens may 
experience fear and anxiety 
• Failure of law enforcement executives to address these psychological 
effects can inhibit the ability of the nation to recover 
 13
Although this study is not focused solely on leadership and the psychological 
effects of terrorism, the education of current and future homeland security leaders in both 
of these areas will benefit the nation’s homeland security efforts. Educating law 
enforcement executives what psychological responses can affect personnel and the 
community strengthens the leader’s efficiency and effectiveness during prevention, 
response and recovery efforts.  
D.  HYPOTHESIS 
This research begins with the hypothesis that, for an increase in participation of 
local law enforcement agencies to practice homeland security strategies, law enforcement 
executives must be provided a clear, defined guide demonstrating that homeland security 
strategies can be implemented in their respected organizations without an increase in 
budget or personnel resources. The analysis of relevant literature shows that this 
hypothesis is reasonable to make and using an accepted academic methodology, 
described below, this research will be helpful to non-major law enforcement agencies to 
prevent future terrorist attacks. For the country to increase the non-major law 
enforcement agencies efficiency and effectiveness in the prevention and protection of 
America, local law enforcement executives must understand what strategies exist that can 
be implemented without a budget increase, how these strategies can be implemented 
within the organization, and how these efforts increase the nation’s homeland security 
efforts.  
One of the reasons this issue is important for the nation is that many local law 
enforcement agencies across the nation do not receive federal funding to participate in 
homeland security. Therefore, this prevents the participation of many of these 
departments. Many law enforcement executives are experiencing budget cuts, which 
forces employee lay offs that further complicate executive’s decisions to implement 
homeland security practices. Furthermore, law enforcement executives fear that 
implementing homeland security practices will negatively impact the ability to meet basic 
police services within their community. For the nation to sustain and increase homeland  
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security participation in the future, law enforcement executives must understand that 
homeland security strategies can be implemented using existing resources and may do so 
without depleting current budget allocations.  
This research provides non-major law enforcement executives with a strategy 
document that will fill this existing gap. This document provides non-major executives 
with specific strategies that can be implemented within their organization with little to no 
cost and uses existing resources within the organization. Specifically, this thesis explores 
which strategies, policies, or programs meet the following criteria for immediate 
implementation. 
• Low or no cost to the organization 
• Can be implemented using existing personnel or without serious impact to 
current levels of basic police services 
• The strategy(s) strengthen community collaboration with the police 
department 
E.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To address the research question focused on how non-major law enforcement 
agencies can participate in America’s homeland security without increasing the 
organization’s funding or personnel to prevent future terrorist attacks, this thesis uses a 
case study as the primary methodology for analysis. The study evaluates national 
homeland security strategies, national homeland security initiatives, and other law 
enforcement agencies’ “best practices” regarding homeland security strategies in relation 
to how the case study department can effectively implement these strategies. In this 
regard, the research also uses analytical frameworks commonly associated with policy 
analysis as it seeks to uncover those policies systematically that can be effectively 
implemented in non-major police departments. While the research uses one non-major 
police department to illustrate the policy analysis, many of the findings are generalizable 
to some degree and with intimate knowledge of another specific non-major department, a 
leader would be able to use these findings to implement sustainable homeland security 
policies more effectively.  
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The Independence Missouri Police Department serves as the basis of this case 
study. The Independence Missouri Police Department is considered a non-major local 
law enforcement agency for many of the reasons outlined above, such as size proximity 
to other large departments and population served. This department is an effective case 
study for this research for several reasons. First, the department Chief of Police, Tom 
Dailey, has publically stated that an urgent need exists to identify additional strategies 
that can strengthen the community’s security, as well of the security of the nation. In 
particular, this identification by the Chief of Police noted that sustainable policies would 
need to consider the distinctions made above between major and non-major departments. 
This research is aware that not all the findings will be applicable to all states and 
localities—the great diversity of state and local laws and cultures are both a strength for 
the country and a challenge to national strategic implementation. However, it is clear that 
the distinction between major and non-major departments must be explored and the 
willingness of the case study department to open itself to research makes it ideal as a 
place to begin this important work.  
Within the last few years, the Independence Missouri Police Department 
implemented different strategies that are proving effective. However, it appears the 
organization may have the ability to strengthen current strategies to prevent future 
terrorist attacks using the results of this study. This study will benefit other non-major 
law enforcement agencies in their quest to prevent future terrorist attacks in their 
community using existing resources and with little or no cost to the organization.  
The Independence Missouri Police Department serves a 78 square mile 
jurisdiction in the heart of the country. The state of Missouri has divergent political and 
ethic diversity. The City of Independence is located within Jackson County. Sixty-seven 
percent of the population served is White, 24% African American, 2% Asian, 1% 
American Indian and Alaskan Native Alone, >1% Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander Alone, 4% Unidentified and 3% Multi-Racial (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The 




Jackson County, with Kansas City Missouri Police Department being the largest. The 
department employs 203 commissioned police officers. Of these, 93% are male and 7% 
are female.  
Obviously, different regions’ non-major departments are comprised of  personnel 
that reflect their service area populations, but the case study focuses on those areas of 
policy analysis more easily transferable from one region and to another. For instance, 
leadership style or the effective implementation of community oriented policing or 
intelligence led policing strategies might vary from the case study department in local 
specifics—but the policies and ideas in general are transferable from one non-major 
department to another.  
In relation to the case study discussed above, specific policies are analyzed in an 
effort to discern those strategies and policies that comprise the most important set upon 
which non-major departments should focus. Government reports, academic research, and 
advocacy reports pertaining to law enforcement homeland security strategies are closely 
examined to identify strengths and weaknesses, existing gaps, and policies, which inhibit 
law enforcement executive’s decision to participate in homeland security practices.  
Based on analysis of information (see literature review for details), this study 
presents a framework for law enforcement executives to implement homeland security 
strategies within their organizations using existing resources and within current budget 
allocations. Importantly, the framework that emerges from this research is reflected 
against the case study department to illustrate how these efforts might actually unfold in a 
real life situation.  
The thesis is further developed through drawing on the collection of data 
regarding homeland security best practices and the findings that frame recommendations 
for non-major police agencies to utilize as a guide to implement strategies within their 
respected organizations. The method is therefore intertwined with the extant theoretical 
literature while always abducting with the reality of temporal concerns each non-major 
department must face as it considers executing this essential but difficult task in the 
current threat environment.  
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II.  BUILDING LEADERS AND THE COMMUNITY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Building leaders within a community is like piecing together a large puzzle. Like 
puzzles, the sides, the shapes, and other attributes differ from piece to piece. One piece 
can look similar and fit easily with another piece. Yet, one piece is always difficult to 
find and can hold the whole process from completion. Meta-leadership holds many pieces 
to a very complicated puzzle. These pieces interlock to help create a picture of public 
safety and aid in the way to organize how a community responds to a possible tragedy or 
any catastrophic event.  
Complex, large-scale events that inflict death, devastation, and chaos can 
challenge even the most experienced homeland security leaders or the largest and most-
well trained or equipped departments. Large-scale incidents require momentous response 
from all corners of the nation: government entities, private businesses, and nonprofit 
organizations. To aid homeland security, leaders in their response to complex, large-scale 
incidents of terrorism or manmade disasters, must possess effective communication skills 
that encourage collaborative efforts between various organizations responding to such 
incidents. The community expects its city leaders to possess the necessary training and 
expertise to prepare, respond, and lead recovery efforts properly following a catastrophic 
event. According to the book Psychology of Terrorism, “Pre-event organized activities 
can have enormous impact on public trust, and perceptions of trust can mitigate the 
impact of negativity bias and heightened feelings of fear and vulnerability (Bongar, 
Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 128).  
Failure in any of these areas of responsibilities can result in the loss of human life 
and long-term psychological distress within the community or within the organization 
responsible for response and recovery efforts.  
For the purpose of this research, the term homeland security includes any 
manmade or natural disaster requiring response from multiple entities.  
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Key city leaders include department directors from the following city 
departments: city manager’s office, city council, finance, fire, health, law, police, power 
and light, public works, technology services, water, and water pollution control.  
B.  META-LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
According to the meta-leadership developers, the lack of communication between 
the police department and the fire department resulted in the loss of human lives during 
the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2006). During the 
development of a leadership program entitled, National Preparedness Leadership 
Initiative, Harvard Professor Leonard J. Marcus, along with Harvard Professor Barry C. 
Dorn, developed the term meta-leadership. This program suggests that homeland security 
leaders who are educated and trained to enhance skills necessary will improve the 
nation's preparation, response, and recovery efforts (Marcus et al., 2006). Meta-
leadership is defined as “A new brand of leadership that challenges individuals to think 
and act cooperatively across organizations and sectors. Meta-Leaders operate outside the 
scope of their traditional professional boundaries, providing inspiration, guidance and 
momentum for a course of action that spans organizational lines” (CDC Foundation, 
2010, About Section). Meta-leadership skills that educate leaders in bringing various 
government and non-government entities together during large-scale responses is offered 
through private and academic organizations. Harvard School of Public Health offers a 
(10) day program entitled, National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, which focuses 
on meta-leadership training. During this 10-day program, homeland security leaders are 
“Trained to strategically and consistently link assets, operations, and resources to achieve 
connectivity in preparing for or responding to an emergency” (CDC Foundation, 2010, 
Overview Section). The curriculum for this course advertises, “The National 
Preparedness Leadership Initiative Executive Education program is designed to build 
capacity for heightened cross-government and cross-sector coordination of effort Meta-
leadership in both preparedness and response” (CDC Foundation, 2010, Curriculum 
Section).  
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According to the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative of Harvard 
University, meta-leadership consists of five principles. (Figure 1) 
 
 
Figure 1.   Five Principles of Meta-Leadership. (From: Marcus, Isaac, Dorn & 
Henderson, 2007) 
C.  SUMMARY OF THE FIVE DIMENSIONS 
The following paragraphs summarize the five dimensions of meta-leadership 
(Marcus et al., 2007).  
 
 
Figure 2.   Summary of Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership. (From: Marcus et al., 
2007) 
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1.  The Person 
A meta-leader demonstrates self-awareness through the identification of 
someone’s own strengths and weaknesses. Self-control, motivation, understanding and 
social skills are additional traits of the meta-leader. When faced with stressful situations, 
a meta-leader recognizes it is essential to act quickly and take immediate command and 
control of the situation. Immediate command and control of the situation by the leader 
demonstrates to others that the meta-leader is in charge and capable of getting everyone 
to work towards solutions. Meta-leaders are driven by visions and goals, which often 
reach outside of their own organizations. This vision, or bigger picture thinking, requires 
the meta-leader to be a leader within the leader’s own organization, and a leader of those 
over who the leader has no formal command and authority, or other jurisdictions, profit, 
and non-profit organizations. The accomplishment of goals is not for oneself, but for a 
much larger cause. Of these traits, the ability to influence others bears the most 
significance.  
2.  The Situation 
This dimension is the ability of meta-leaders to filter information and accurately 
determine what the problem is. After the problem is determined, metaleaders must 
formulate the proper response and then take decisive action. Situational awareness, 
during complex problem solving situations, allows the meta-leader to anticipate future 
problems, formulate responses, and make proactive decisions to lessen or avoid 
additional problems. During complex, large-scale problem solving, situational awareness 
is critical for the meta-leader. If the meat-leader lacks the ability to ascertain exactly what 
the problem is, unnecessary manpower and/or resources may be wasted. During complex 
problems, situations often change, which requires the meta-leader to recognize the 
change, adapt and overcome. This characteristic is considered the most important 
leadership trait associated with situation. The ability to factor actual, perceived, and 
unknown threats provides the meta-leader with opportunities to formulate calculated risks 
during the decision-making process. During complex, large-scale catastrophic events, 
meta-leaders need to consider what actions their own organization should take coupled 
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with how other organizations will be affected by these decisions. Finally, the meta-leader 
possesses self-confidence. Self-confidence provides the meta-leader with the courage 
necessary to take the driver’s seat while realizing not everyone will agree with the 
decisions made. How do meta-leaders gain the trust and respect necessary to gain 
followers? According to meta-leadership, meta-leaders must lead the silo.  
3.  Lead the Silo 
Establishing credibility and respect as a meta-leader within the meta-leader’s own 
organization will help build credibility with the community and with other organizations 
and sectors outside the meta-leader’s command and authority. This development becomes 
especially important for the collaboration efforts between the meta-leader’s organization, 
the community and outside organizations and entities. If the meta-leader is able to gain 
the necessary support from within, and outside of the meta-leader’s organization, 
determining goals, or shared visions, becomes a balancing act for the meta-leader. While 
developing shared goals, the meta-leader recognizes it is essential to understand the 
different cultures or missions of the various agencies involved and the community, which 
the meta-leader serves. Analyzing how each organization fits into the mission and how 
each can contribute to the success of reaching the goals will help link the various groups 
together.  
4.  Lead Up 
Influence is shaped by informing and educating someone’s supervisor, which 
requires the meta-leader to keep the boss informed of pertinent information, good or bad. 
Leading-up includes educating the supervisor at every opportunity to build the 
supervisor’s competence level and to demonstrate that of the meta-leader’s, which does 
not require the employee to demonstrate blind loyalty. Demonstrating dependability, 
honesty, reliability and loyalty towards the boss may provide opportunities for the meta-
leader to promote and pursue the meta-leader’s ideas and proposals. The meta-leader’s 
efforts are for the greater cause, not for self-recognition and status. The meta-leader 
influences the boss using this process. The meta-leader may not work directly with 
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elected or appointed officials so the meta-leader’s ideas and programs are communicated 
via bosses. Building relationships with other organizations and the community takes time 
and energy. The meta-leader recognizes this and understands that without the boss’s 
support, it will be difficult, if not impossible to accomplish.  
5.  Lead Across 
This dimension is accomplished by providing leadership and communication 
necessary to bring outside agencies and the community together. The meta-leader 
combines the resources and efforts of participating organizations and the community 
together to build additional resources, therefore, having the capability to accomplish 
more than ever before. Building on relationships, before a tragedy strikes, enables the 
meta-leader to facilitate meetings so that available resources can be identified, sharing 
this information with others, and working through exercises with the involved groups. 
Having the courage to step out front and make things happen separates the meta-leader 
from others within the organization. This effort will require the meta-leader to have 
patience and persistence.  
D.  ANALYSIS OF META-LEADERSHIP AND MINIMIZING ADVERSE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES: CAN THIS MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE? 
During the course of this study, the author’s intention was to determine the core 
meaning of meta-leadership and analyze how this leadership philosophy can impact 
leadership during a crisis and the potential psychological consequences following a 
complex, large-scale incident within a community. Meta-leadership is unique in two 
areas, (1) facilitates communication and direction within the community, private entities 
and across organizational boundaries, and (2) encourages leaders to act [lead] for the 
advancement of organizations outside of their control as well as their own.  
The meta-leadership theory bridges homeland security and leadership using a 
consistent message that homeland security leaders must improve communication and 
collaboration within and outside of their own organizations for the purpose of planning, 
preparing, and collaborating efforts. Three common themes emerge with regard to 
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lessons learned following a catastrophic event occurring within the nation: (1) the need 
for improved communication/collaboration within the various homeland security 
organizations, (2) strong leadership skills are required to resolve complex situations to 
reduce fear and anxiety, and (3) how politics (local, state, or federal politicians) can 
interfere with homeland security preparation, response, and recovery efforts. Meta-
leadership philosophies relates to all three of these gaps within its five dimensions.  
Does meta-leadership work? If so, how is this measured? Does measurable 
success really matter? What constitutes successful preparation, response, and recovery in 
homeland security? This topic, similar to “what is the definition of homeland security,” is 
a matter of opinion and very subjective in discussions among non-professionals. To date, 
no academic case studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of meta-leadership, or 
a correlation of this philosophy and the reduction of adverse psychological consequences. 
However, Professor Marcus points to United States Coast Guard Commandant Thad 
Allen as a successful meta-leader by stating: 
He [Allen] had to engage a number of political leaders and other agencies 
to coordinate a vast array of activity, and he was really good about 
reaching out, engaging, listening, and trying to make sure that everybody 
was strategically moving in the same direction. (Straw, 2010, Magazine 
Section) 
The meta-leader strategy provides a methodology for homeland security leaders to 
increase communications and collaboration both within and outside of their respected 
organizations and within the communities they serve. Applying the meta-leadership 
philosophy to non-major police agencies is foundational for creating a needed common 
language between departments, as well the community leaders and citizens. Homeland 
security is a huge challenge that seems difficult to place within this puzzle without some 
similar leadership framework, which allows a multidiscipline approach with common 
vision and understanding. It is essential that non-major agencies provide a service to their 
community to ensure safety from terrorism while keeping in mind budget and personnel 
allowances. If regional key leaders—as defined above—can agree to pursue meta-
leadership methods, the implementation of other important policies and strategies can be 
more effectively implemented.  
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Meta-leadership is a philosophy that organizations should incorporate to educate 
and promote communication and collaboration of efforts within and outside of the 
organization. According to the book entitled, Psychology of Terrorism, engaging the 
public so that “…the views and practices of communities and their possible responses 
could inform response and recovery strategies, as well as education and preparedness 
strategies” (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 187). This 
brief analysis of the utility of meta-leadership principles addresses the active engagement 
of the public as suggested and creates the possibility for an environment in which more 
effective homeland security policies can be implemented in non-major departments.  
E.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS—META-LEADERSHIP 
While meta-leadership is just a philosophy, individual leaders or organizations 
need to decide to pursue and practice the five dimensions of meta-leadership. This 
commitment will better prepare communities across the nation for more effective 
homeland security effectiveness. Organizations—and where possible, regions—must 
constantly pursue the concept of building a cadre of homeland security professionals in a 
unified manner. The meta-leadership philosophy provides a foundation for homeland 
security leaders to educate and prepare themselves for how they can make improvements 
with regard to their responsibilities related to the emerging world of homeland security 
concerns.  
Communication and collaboration efforts framed in the five meta-leadership 
dimensions will “…reduce psychological casualties by increasing the public’s confidence 
and sense of mastery and reducing fear through communicating convincingly to the 
public that the community is ready in the event of a bioterrorism event” (Butler, Panzer, 
& Goldfrank, 2003, p. 106). This concept is key to every aspect necessary for effective 
leadership through difficult budgetary and political situations leaders face as they work to 
more effectively prepare their departments for the homeland security environment non-
major departments’ face.  
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The proactive nature of the meta-leadership philosophy reaches both within and 
outside of the organization to increase communication and collaboration effectiveness 
while strengthening the preparedness, response and recovery efforts. As Breckenridge 
and Zambardo suggest, “It is essential that government leadership make every effort to 
‘take the terror out of terrorism’ by deploying programs to address the psychosocial 
processes that underlie public perceptions before, during, and after a terrorist emergency” 
(Bongar et al., 2007, p. 127). The five meta-leadership dimensions meet that challenge 
effectively.  
Meta-leadership provides an avenue for homeland security practicioners to reduce 
adverse psychological consenquences within their community by increasing 
communication and collaboration efforts from within and across organizational 
bounderies while empowering the community to become involved with the process. This 
philosophy provides non-major police departments that necessary framework to 
encourage collaboration between police officials, other stakeholders in the community 
and citizens in general. While not always painless, collaboration is cheap; it is financed 
through effective communication. That communication when properly documented, will 
help departments effectively and efficiently use existing personnel and make decisions 
that directly impact citizens and the community in which they live.  
Meta-leadership is the base upon which non-major departments should build their 
homeland security framework and implementation in a highly budget constrained world.  
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III.  POST 9/11 CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
A.  BUDGET CONSTRAINTS  
According to a 2008 article published in Public Budgeting & Finance, “Many 
local governments today are experiencing revenue shortfalls, especially in the critical 
area of emergency management where expectations exceed revenue realities. Emergency 
management systems are subject to rising costs, unfunded mandates, and greater service 
expectation” (MacManus & Caruson, 2008). “The continuous threat of terrorism has 
thrust domestic preparedness obligations to the very top of law enforcement agenda. For 
today’s law enforcement executive, the capacity must be considered as much a staple of 
law enforcement operations as crime analysis, criminal intelligence, and crime 
prevention” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005, p. vi).  
Following the year 2001 and looking forward, law enforcement, particularly local 
law enforcement, has been on the front lines of terrorism. The democratic society in 
which Americans live places an “enormous degree of responsibility and authority for 
public security…” and this authority historically is delegated to local governments and 
the police agencies working for them (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
2001, p. 5). Due to the current economic times, many law enforcement executives feel 
pressured now, more than ever, on meeting the needs of the community with scarce 
resources. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, one of the most 
significant concerns facing non-major law enforcement executives today is the issue of 
terrorism prevention (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001). In the United 
States, law enforcement has been asked to serve as the last line of defense against 
terrorism (Murray, 2005). Where and how does this ‘staple” fit into the organization 
without depleting personnel resources and increasing already threatened budgets? Non-
major law enforcement agencies across the nation are experiencing unprecedented budget 
cuts. According to a popular law enforcement police blog site entitled, Policeone, more 
than half the agencies questioned have been affected by funding cuts in recent months 
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(PoliceOne.com, 2011). Regardless of the location or size of a community, they are not 
insulated from being the target of the next terrorist attack. Since law enforcement is 
considered the first line of defense of the nation, non-major law enforcement executives 
are challenged with the ability to keep their communities safe from terrorism without the 
funding sources to increase personnel or initiate new programs.  
B.  HOMELAND SECURITY—AVOIDING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
Top law enforcement executives across the nation are concerned more than ever 
on how they continue to provide basic police services within their community while 
facing decreasing budgets and reduction of employees (Carroll, 2011). The community 
places expectations on executives that they will ensure that basic police services are met 
while addressing any peripheral issues that place the safety of the community in jeopardy. 
Furthermore, the expectations require executives to communicate effectively on what 
their organization is doing to make the community safer.  
Executives attending community speaking events, such as town hall meetings, 
neighborhood watch group meetings, and community civic meetings, find that the words 
“homeland security” are often followed by the citizen question, “What is the police 
department doing?” Failure to implement homeland security strategies can make this 
topic the “elephant” in the room that law enforcement executives will try to avoid rather 
than tackle head on. Advising the community that the police department is not capable of 
implementing homeland security strategies is a risky stance for any executive.  
C.  LOOKING IN THE MIRROR—ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES: 
THE FIRST STEP IN AVOIDING THE ELEPHANT 
To confront problems facing organizations properly, a needs assessment to 
uncover the organizations underlying issues and concerns should be developed. As an 
example, an assessment was conducted within the Independence Missouri Police 
Department due to the increase in calls for service. The range of functions added to police 
duties in recent years and a decreasing budget forced the organization to conduct a 
realistic assessment of police services provided to the community. The organization faced 
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the reality that staff resources of the organization are stretched beyond the ability to cope 
with the communities growing demands. The goal of this assessment was to discover 
alternate methods of policing in contrast to the financial and personnel constraints being 
placed upon it. Following the assessment, the Independence Missouri Police Department 
command staff concluded the following. 
• Decisions to be made regarding the reduction or elimination of provided 
police services to increase officers’ available (non-committed) time to 
problem solve within the community. Currently, the average committed 
time for officers is 66.7 percent. Committed time entails answering calls 
for service and report writing only; it  does not include proactive policing, 
administrative tasks or other tasks, such as training, which leaves very 
little, if any time, for the officer to problem solve within the community. 
Furthermore, the inability to problem solve within the community reduces 
the agency’s ability to build trust and collaboration.  
• Address disorder and nuisance violations using target-oriented policing to 
improve the quality of life for residents and to increase the communities 
trust in an effort to increase the reporting of crime, disorder and suspicious 
activity. Efforts to address disorder and nuisance violations are typically 
only addressed as a reactive response when officers discover violations 
during a call for service. Seaming the communication gap with the public 
and increasing community collaboration will allow police officers to take 
a proactive stance and increase community collaboration efforts.  
• Limited staff and resources must be strategically deployed so that officers 
address emergency calls for service within a reasonable time and the 
reduction of crime and disorder occurs. The primary purpose of 
intelligence-led policing is timely, accurate information. Leveraging crime 
statistics and collecting intelligence obtained via police officers are areas 
that the Independence Missouri Police Department is doing well with the 
implementation of CORE. Intelligence obtained through daily contacts 
with citizens and business owners is an area that the Independence 
Missouri Police Department has yet to leverage.  
• Leveraging the community to strengthen the city’s homeland security 
efforts 
D.  ANALYSIS OF RAND REPORT: MAJOR CITY HOMELAND SECURITY 
PROGRAMS—DO STRATEGIES EXIST THAT FILL THE CURRENT 
GAP? 
RAND completed an analysis of Major City Police Departments in 2010 entitled, 
Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and 
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Homeland Security. This study contributes to the homeland security research field by 
providing an analysis of the long-term impacts terrorism places on law enforcement 
agencies that practice HS and counterterrorism (CT) strategies. The important delineation 
between this report and the purpose of this thesis is that the RAND study is based on five 
large city law enforcement agencies that receive funding to support homeland security 
strategies within their respected communities. Drawing from this study, an analysis of the 
RAND study reveals indicators and factors that support homeland strategies and practices 
for non-major law enforcement agencies that result in little or no cost and without adding 
personnel to support the strategies.  
 
2010 Rand Report 








Responsibilities Across Disciplines No Yes 
Fusion Center Start-up New Fusion Center Yes Yes 
Fusion Center Increased Collaboration Across Sectors No No 
Fusion Center Designated Officer to Serve as Liaison with other Intelligence Sources  No No 
NIMS Standardized Language During Incident Response No Yes 
NIMS Training 
Requirements 
Train all employee on Federal NIMS 
suggested Requirements Yes No 
Long Term Organizational 
Focus HS/CT 
Technology Implementation to Share 
Info and Intelligence Variable No 
Long Term Organizational 
Focus HS/CT 
Overall Cultural or Paradigm Shift No No 
Relationship Building with 
Local Community 
Improved Outreach and Relationship 
Building No No 
Table 1.   Analysis of 2010 RAND Study  
The analysis of the RAND study revealed the following homeland security 
strategies (Figure 3) that can be implemented by non-major law enforcement agencies 
without increasing budgets or adding additional personnel resources.  
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Figure 3.   Recommended Homeland Security Strategies for Non-Major Law 
Enforcement Agencies 
Albeit the term “leadership” is not directly listed within the RAND study, failing 
to include this component will neglect the need to ensure that the law enforcement 
community develops and sustains current and future homeland security leaders. The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police argues that the importance of local police 
leadership prior to, during, and after a terrorism event is “urgently” needed (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001). On June 5, 2008, Homeland Secretary Michael 
Chertoff charged Judge William Webster with the task to chair an advisory committee to 
prepare a summary report on the top 10 challenges facing the nation’s homeland security. 
On September 11, 2008, the Homeland Security Advisory Council released the resulting 
report entitled, Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security. 
Within this report, leadership and the need for the nation to prepare a “cadre” of 
homeland security leaders for the future of the nation’s security made the top 10 lists 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
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The purpose of this summary is to provide a framework for this thesis on how the 
non-major law enforcement executive can implement SAR, Terrorism Liaison Officer 
(TLO) personnel, increased community collaboration, and develop a leadership program 
with little or no cost to the agency and without increasing manpower.  
E.  SAR REPORTING: A NON-MAJOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
Getting line officers to recognize and report potential terrorism-related 
activity is important. Having citizens do so is important as well. (Wagers 
& Bryan, 2011, p. 20)  
What is the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) and why was this program 
developed? According to a 2009 report published by the Congressional Research Service, 
the federal government developed NSI in response to the 2007 National Strategy for 
Information Sharing Strategy mandating the federal government develop a 
“…nationwide capacity for a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, 
documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity 
that is potentially terrorism-related while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of 
Americans” (Randol, 2009, p. 7). An article published by The Police Chief in 2011 states 
a SAR report is, ‘is a report used to document any reported or observed activity, or any 
criminal act or attempted criminal act, which an officer believes may reveal a nexus to 
foreign or domestic terrorism…The SAR process focuses on what law enforcement 
agencies have been doing for years—gathering information regarding behaviors and 
incidents associated with crime and establishing a process whereby information can be 
shared to detect and prevent criminal activity, including that associated with domestic 
and international terrorism” (Colwell & Kelly, 2011).  
Non-major law enforcement agencies can enhance homeland security efforts 
through the adoption and implementation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative. The adoption of the SAR will provides a framework for the 
department in developing policy and procedures in the use of SAR reporting. 
Coordinating information with fusion centers will strengthen vertical and horizontal  
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homeland security intelligence sharing. For example, The Los Angeles Police 
Department, under the authority of Chief William J. Bratton, implemented the SAR 
reporting process in March 2008 (ACLU of Washington, n.d.).  
In 2008, two days before Christmas, a decorated military veteran named Steven 
Jordal was arrested outside of a crowded shopping mall in Oklahoma while in possession 
of a bomb and a handgun. The arresting officer documented information from the 
incident and forwarded to his commanding officers. This intelligence sharing resulted in 
the arrest of Steven Jordal for multiple counts of possession of bomb-making material. 
During the investigation, it was determined that Jordal was making IED devices and 
selling them to gang members. One month prior to the officer’s actions, he attended shift-
level training on the importance of documenting suspicious activity during report writing 
and then alerting supervisors of the incident for intelligence screening purposes (Cid, 
2009). This powerful example demonstrates how acts of terrorism can be revealed when 
proper documentation and sharing of this information can prevent acts of terrorism.  
Organizational implementation of NSI will require five processes to occur: 
information acquisition, organizational processing, integration and consolidation, data 
retrieval and distribution, and feedback (Colwell & Kelly, 2011). The three stories above 
demonstrate how the SAR impacts day-to-day police business. Since specific strategies 
are in place, SAR reporting proves to be effective and efficient in securing a community 
from possible terroristic threats.  
SAR was developed recognizing that the general operation of police departments 
vary across the nation. The NSI program proclaims that SAR can be implemented by any 
agency without adding personnel regardless of its size. The reporting method allows for 
agencies to develop policies and procedures allowing for full implementation by all levels 
of the law enforcement community (tribal, local, state, and federal), and the initiative was 
developed with the protection, privacy, and civil liberties of all Americans as a priority. 
According to the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, “All agencies, regardless of 
size or jurisdiction, have a role in the nationwide SAR process” (United States Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 3). Non-major law enforcement agencies do have a role in the 
SAR reporting and it can provide an avenue to increase communications and 
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collaboration with the community. In addtion, SAR reporting establishes a standardized 
form of reporting suspicious activity internally to reduce opportunities of information 
being lost or information not followed up on.  
F.  CASE STUDY EXAMPLE: IMPLEMENTING SAR REPORTING 
WITHIN THE INDEPENDENCE MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The Independence Missouri Police Department employs two civilian crime 
analysts who work Monday–Friday 0730 to 1600 hours. The crime analysts report to the 
Deputy Chief of Field Operations who oversees all field operation divisions of the police 
department (Uniform Patrol, Special Operations, and Investigations). Approximately two 
years ago, the police department implemented an intelligence-led policing strategy called 
CORE (Crime Overview Response and Evaluation). The two crime analysts spend a 
majority of their time collecting, analyzing, and disseminating crime reports for 
department CORE meetings that occur weekly. This activity limits the crime analyst’s 
ability to dedicate time and effort towards the collection, processing, analyzing, and 
dissemination of homeland security intelligence within the organization and with other 
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Recognizing that the crime analysts 
cannot fulfill the homeland security intelligence needs of the department, a strategy that 
uses existing personnel within the organization is needed to strengthen the homeland 
security intelligence cycle.  
The current manpower allocation for the Independence Missouri Police 
Department is operating at its maximum capacity due to increasing crime rates, limited 
budget allocation, and high numbers of calls for service. The organization is unable to 
form a part-time or full-time unit of civilian or commissioned employees to specifically 
deal with homeland security intelligence issues. Furthermore, the Independence Missouri 
Police Department lacks formal policies or procedures in reporting homeland security 
intelligence for commissioned or non-commissioned employees. Recently, this researcher 
asked various employees and supervisors during regular briefings if they knew what to do 
if they suspect that someone is involved or connected to a terrorist organization. Many 
Independence Missouri Police Department employees’ comments varied and seldom did 
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the response include the utilization of the Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning 
(KCTEW) fusion center. During these discussions, employees were asked if they are 
aware of Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning’s function. The majority of employees 
responded that they did not know. The most common answer received from employees is 
that a departmental Field Interview Form (FIF) is completed and sent to the department’s 
crime analysts for processing. Several problems exist with this answer. First, the current 
FIF form is based on street-level crime information; the current form lacks relevant 
information to note activity that may be linked to terrorism. Secondly, no policies or 
procedures within the Independence Missouri Police Department exist to ensure this 
information is properly handled. Finally, no policy(s) exists within the Independence 
Missouri Police Department that mandates how or when information requires further 
dissemination outside of the organization.  
1.  Needs Assessment 
Within this strategy development, three areas must be evaluated before a strategy 
is considered acceptable. First, due to insufficient funding, the strategy or resulting 
procedure(s) must work using existing personnel resources of the organization. Initially, 
using existing resources will require personnel and money; however, training specific 
leaders as “train the trainers” will provide on-going instruction to employees and will 
minimize on-going training costs for the organization. Once leaders are provided the 
knowledge and framework of the program, they could resume their current positions 
within the department. Second, the strategy should include clear, concise procedures for 
department-wide implementation to strengthen intelligence sharing within the 
organization and outside law enforcement entities. Finally, the strategy or resulting 
procedure(s) does not violate citizen privacy acts, municipal, state, and federal laws. 
Since specific guidelines are adopted and then followed, citizens basic rights are 
maintained by the constitution and the integrity of each organization that implements 
policy.  
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2.  Options Available to Address the Homeland Security Intelligence 
Cycle 
a.  Option 1 
The Independence Missouri Police Department operates without making 
adaptations to current procedures. No strategy has been developed to strengthen the 
homeland security intelligence cycle. Opting to remain status quo can result in failure of 
the organization to “connect the dots,” which allows potential acts of terrorism to go 
undetected that could result in a catastrophic event. The current situation, operating with 
little to no partnership with homeland security intelligence, hinders the responsibility the 
department has with the community and nation as being the nation’s first line of defense.  
b.  Option 2 
Some local law enforcement agencies utilize law enforcement network 
groups to share information using secured websites. Networks, such as the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the 
Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISSnet), can be effective tools for sharing 
information; however, relying on networks alone fails to provide a departmental 
homeland security strategy for the Independence Missouri Police Department. The 
feasibility in providing members of the organization access to these networks will be 
difficult, if not impossible. Ensuring all of the information is entered correctly into all of 
the above databases will create the need for more personnel, which directly makes for 
budget concerns. This option feels overwhelming and inefficient. Key organization 
members should continue to be encouraged to use this form of networking. However, this 
option alone will not fully address the organization’s current need.  
c.  Option 3 
Adoption and implementation of the NSI, through the coordination and 
assistance of the KCTEW center, provides departments with an avenue to document 
possible concerns properly. The adoption of the SAR will provide a framework for the 
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department to develop policies and procedures in homeland security strategies for the 
Independence Missouri Police Department. Coordinating information with the KCTEW 
center will strengthen vertical and horizontal homeland security intelligence sharing, 
which allows the organization to function at a higher level. This option will require 
additional work prior to the adoption of SAR in the department. The implementation 
process requires staffed meetings to discuss existing and future policy processes, which 
will encourage development, training, and outreach.  
NSI was developed recognizing that the operations of police departments 
vary across the nation. NSI reveals that SAR can be implemented by any agency without 
adding personnel regardless of its size. The SAR program allows for agencies to develop 
through policies and procedures allowing for full implementation by all levels of the law 
enforcement community (tribal, local, state, and federal). The initiative was developed 
with the protection, privacy, and civil liberties of all Americans as a priority. According 
to the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, SAR is obtainable and useful to all 
agencies regardless of size (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008). 
G.  CONCLUSION SAR REPORTING FOR THE INDEPENDENCE 
MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT 
To pursue the organization’s commitment to homeland security, the organization 
must adopt a strategy to implement the NSI initiative. Option #3 provides the framework 
necessary to strengthen an organization’s intelligence cycle, while meeting the needs of 
the organization without the need to hire additional personnel. To assist law enforcement 
agencies in the adoption and implementation of SAR, the United States Bureau of Justice 
Assistance developed a guide entitled, Suspicious Activity Reporting Process 
Implementation Checklist (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008). This 
checklist will ensure uniformity within the department and encourage proper 
documentation, which directly impacts communication and performance.  
The Independence Missouri Police Department should consider implementation 
of SAR using the following courses of action suggested by this checklist. 
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• Closely collaborate with partners, such as fusion centers, homeland 
security officials, joint terrorism task forces, and the eGuardian program.  
• Brief command staff/senior management on the SAR implementation 
process, to include policy development, privacy and civil liberties 
protections, technology, training, and community outreach.  
• Assign primary responsibility for implementing the SAR process to a 
command-level position.  
• Provide training to command staff/senior management on the 
implementation of the SAR process using agency training or programs 
already developed (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008)  
SAR reporting training will be the same for all police department employees. 
However, how the SAR reporting process is implemented within the agency can vary. 
The SAR reporting program provides non-major law enforcement agencies with the 
opportunity to strengthen internal intelligence processes and information sharing within 
the agency. Incorporating the SAR process with field reporting can provide non-major 
law enforcement agencies the ability to streamline the organization’s reporting process. 
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IV.  CASE STUDY—A COMPARISON MODEL OF THE UK 
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
The future successes of intelligence led policing efforts depend largely on the 
agency's ability to collaborate with the citizens and businesses in a meaningful way 
(Carroll, 2011). The purpose of this section is to outline the policing strategies employed 
by the United Kingdom (UK) and discuss how a modified understanding of the UK 
policing strategies could strengthen the American law enforcement intelligence-led 
policing model through the collaboration of the community and private sector. This 
comparison model of the UK provides a foundation for the non-major police agencies to 
engage successful leadership strategies, as well as a framework for citizens and 
businesses to collaborate in a specific initiative. The implementation of SAR requires 
active policing within the community and bolstering community awareness. This impact 
may provide intelligence about future terrorist threats and reporting the information to the 
correct agencies to pursue action. This level of community support is necessary to ensure 
safety for all citizens.  
The police and the citizens share ownership of the community problems (Scott & 
Goldstein, 2005). Although the police can solely address some crime and disorder, other 
problems require community-led efforts (Scott & Goldstein, 2005). Police serve as the 
enforcement element of this effort. The Independence Missouri Police Department 
believes the quality of life within each neighborhood results from a vested interest from 
both the police and the community. The community must work with the district officer 
who is familiar with that area; however, the police department is challenged with how to 
increase the one-on-one contact with the community.  
Strategies utilized in the United Kingdom may provide the seam needed to 
strengthen the organization’s information-sharing and collaboration capabilities with the 
community; further advancing the organization’s intelligence-led policing process to 
reduce crime and disorder with minimal or low cost and without adding personnel 
resources. These attributes are important for non-major law enforcement agencies 
looking for low cost strategies to implement within their communities that strengthen the 
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community’s ability to prevent acts of terrorism. The United Kingdom found a 
correlation between perception of crime by the public and reported crime. The percentage 
of people who thought the local police did a good to excellent job increased year to year. 
Over a six-year period, confidence from the general public had for the police increased 
by six points, and in 2008–2009, statistics stood at 53% (Myhill & Quinton, 2010). Public 
confidence continued in an upward trend, while perception of crime continued to 
decrease (Myhill & Quinton, 2010).  
Public confidence is directly linked to personal policing and relationship building 
within the community. This kind of policing does not add dollar signs to a budget, nor 
does it require additional officers. Non-major agencies could easily implement personal 
contact time with local citizens through many different community service events, 
through school involvement, and even the way calls are accepted and later followed up 
on. Building a relationship with the community takes time and a lot of dedication. It is 
proven that perception can affect crime within the community. During 2010, UK research 
indicated that positive public perception of the police did have a correlation in the 
reduction of crimes in the communities studied (Myhill & Quinton, 2010). 
A.  INDEPENDENCE MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE 
LED POLICING SOLUTIONS/STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: CORE 
AND COPS 
The City of Independence, Missouri is located along the eastern edge of the 
Kansas City Metropolitan area with a population of 116,830 as reported in the 2010 
census. It is the fourth largest city in the state of Missouri. The Independence, Missouri 
Police Department serves the community with a staff of 203 sworn officers and 97 
civilians. The total police to population ratio is 1.74 compared to the national average of 
2.3 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009).  
According to the department’s crime analyst, during 2008 and 2009, Part 1, 
property crimes experienced a decrease in crime due to the department’s CORE 















 Difference Percent 
Robbery 
Armed 19  15 -4 -27% 
Table 2.   Decrease in Robbery Armed. (From: Dachenhausen, 2009) 
The Independence Missouri Police Department also experienced a decrease in 
non-residential burglaries in the first, second, and third quarter during CORE initiatives 





































50 -19% -38% 
Table 3.   Decrease in Burglary Non-Residence. (From: Dachenhausen, 2009) 
Prior to the implementation of CORE in 2008, the city experienced a significant 









                
Criminal Homicide 2 7 9 3 8 -11% 167% 
Negligent Manslaughter 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0% 
Forcible Rape 56 41 52 48 36 -31% -25% 
Attempted Rape 5 4 5 3 7 40% 133% 
Robbery 138 154 163 167 123 -25% -26% 
Aggravated Assault 612 631 595 528 310 -48% -41% 
                
Subtotals Violent Part 1 Crimes 813 837 825 749 484 -41% -35% 
                
Burglary / Breaking and Entering 1236 1304 1413 1328 1246 -12% -6% 
Larceny/Theft 5538 5547 5904 5135 5242 -11% 2% 
Motor Vehicle Theft 834 1082 779 703 735 -6% 5% 
Arson 40 35 27 29 22 -19% -24% 
                
Subtotal Property Part 1 Crimes 7648 7968 8123 7195 7245 -11% 1% 
                
Total Part 1 Crimes 8461 8805 8948 7944 7729 -14% -3% 
Table 4.   Independence Missouri Crime Statistics 2006–2010 
The above charts provide a breakdown of crime and disorder in the City of 
Independence, Missouri. After implementation of CORE/COPS, there is visible reduction 
in various crimes across the board, noting the program’s success.  
B.  CORE/COPS 
Subsequent to the Independence Missouri’s Police Chief’s appointment, Chief 
Dailey implemented an intelligence-led policing strategy called Crime Overview 
Response and Evaluation (CORE). Following the implementation of CORE, a second 
intelligence-led policing concept termed Community Oriented Problem Solving (COPS) 
was integrated into the CORE process. Both CORE and COPS are strategies employed by 
the Independence Missouri Police Department that involve collaboration with residents, 
businesses, and other government organizations to solve systemic issues that cause crime 
and disorder. Solutions to crime and disorder issues are generally not found within the 
criminal justice system, but instead found within the community (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2010).  
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Command staff and police department employees work hand-in-hand with the 
community. Many issues and concerns are addressed “on the scene” and tackled witht a 
direct plan in mind to ensure officer safety, as well as citizen rights. CORE/COPS 
provide a framework for citizens to partner with police officials with positive, specific 
procedures. Looking at CORE and COPS, and investigating its conception, may provide 
an excellent insight to the implementing a homeland security program within the 
Indepenedene Missouri Police Department.  
In 2005, the Police Executive Research Forum released Protecting Your 
Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement. This report states, 
“Local law enforcement should remain committed to using a problem-solving approach 
to both crime and terrorism that builds on successful partnerships with citizens” (Davies, 
Plotkin, Filler, Flynn, Forseman, Litzinger, McCarthy & Wiseman, 2005, p. 78).  
The key elements of the Independence Missouri Police Department CORE 
process are the following. 
• Timely and accurate information obtained from officers, investigators, and 
citizens for inspection by the crime analysis unit, and distributed in a 
timely fashion 
• Effective and creative tactics and strategies developed by not only 
commanders and supervisors, but line officers close to the problem at hand 
• Rapid deployment of available resources inside and outside the 
department 
• Constant follow-up and evaluation by command staff members to 
determine if tactics are effective; adjustment may be required to deliver 
results 
COPS is a philosophy of the police working together with the community to solve 
crime and disorder issues, in which ownership of the problem is not exclusively assigned 
to the police. The COPS process recognizes that a cooperative effort between citizens, 
businesses, service agencies, and the police is often required to solve these problems. 
Examples of crime and disorder in the community include a new business opening in the 
neighborhood, which in turn, attracts young people who drive recklessly to get there. A 
homeowner moves and converts the house into rental property, and then leases it to 
individuals who have loud parties every weekend. A nearby city park attracts juveniles 
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who vandalize the area with graffiti. Disorder issues plague many communities and are a 
nuisance to citizens, businesses, and the police. Disorder issues waste public resources 
and reflect poorly upon the community as a whole. Often the first reaction is to report this 
issue to the police and expect the problem to be solved permanently by responding 
officers. In reality, the situation is temporarily resolved using either an arrest or the 
issuance of a warning. Often the problem resurfaces and the problem continues in the 
future. Failing to problem solve issues and providing closure to such issues creates many 
problems for the police department and community alike. Some of these issues include 
community distrust that the police will not assist them on issues of concern, which 
reduces the ability to form a strong community collaboration and expending resources 
and time of officers to deal with the ongoing problems rather than focusing on homeland 
security strategies within the community.  
Non-major law enforcement agencies must focus on policing strategies that will 
lessen the workload of officers to allow them additional time to focus on homeland 
security strategies and practices. To strengthen this strategy, agencies should focus on 
building strong collaboration with the community to allow the community to serve as the 
eyes and ears for the police department.  
Since the implementation of CORE within the Independence Missouri Police 
Department, the organization continues to experience positive results in reducing crime 
and disorder. For example, in 2010, the city experienced an increase in property crimes in 
a district located on the northeast section of the community. On April 24, 2010, the 
department identified the area as a “core initiative” (also referred to as a hot spot). The 
information is disseminated to department members via electronic crime/intelligence 
bulletins, weekly meetings between assigned officers, supervisors, and division 
commanders to discuss policing strategies to reduce crime and disorder within the hot-
spot area. After policing strategies are agreed upon, officers from the uniform, 
investigative, traffic safety, and tactical units implement the strategies. The assigned 
supervisors in each division constantly monitor the CORE initiative and tactics are 
discussed and/or changed based on the intelligence gathered. The CORE Initiative, 
entitled 10-04, began on April 24, 2010 and a department crime analyst noted a decrease 
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in crime during the May 12, 2010 reporting period. CORE and COPS are examples of 
collaborative initiatives among police officials and the citizens. Like all newly 
implemented programs, a foundation of trust must be laid. Once the community believes 
in a program and the people trying to implement it, then positive results are just a matter 
of time (See Hawthorne statistic table in Appendix A). 
Major and non-major police departments face ongoing concerns on a daily basis. 
Non-major police departments must constantly be adapting to decreasing budgets and 
personnel with a possible increase of community concerns, such as terrorism threats. 
Major police departments are more likely to receive federal assistance due to size and the 
number of citizens affected by police decisions on a daily basis. Non-major agencies 
must continue to look within their department to overcome such issues without increasing 
budget and personnel.  
After implementing the department’s crime reduction efforts in the targeted area, 
a decrease in property crimes occurred. This CORE initiative started on April 24 and was 
closed mid-June. Once a CORE initiative is activated, an activity log is started and placed 
within a central computer location to which all police department employees have access. 
The purpose of the CORE activity log is to share any information that the employee 
believes is pertinent to the collaborative crime reduction strategy. CORE activity logs 
typically include information, such as enforcement activity, people of interest, 
investigative leads, or details of crimes reported in the target area. Appendix B provides a 
framework on how these efforts are conducted and communicated to various department 
members during this specific CORE initiative. The CORE process has built a stronger 
communication network both internally and within the community. Reducing crime and 
disorder within the community has done the same. This process forms relationships with 
the police officers and the community, and therefore, increases the communities’ 
willingness to report crime and disorder. Unsolicited comments from officers indicate an 
increased feeling of “ownership” exists to resolving problems with the community. This 
communications foundation is important in building community collaboration and trust 
for the success of future homeland security programs.  
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Appendix C depicts a summary of the total hours of time committed within the 
CORE initiative area by the various uniform patrol units and various specialized units. A 
total of 116 hours, 25 minutes and 33 seconds is documented within the department’s 
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system from the period of April 25, 2010 through May 
16, 2010. The CORE strategy facilitated a coordinated effort from the various divisions 
of the department to target the specific geographic area, provided a mechanism to 
communicate law enforcement (LE) efforts, and ultimately, reduced crime in the targeted 
area.  
Representatives from the various divisions within the organization meet weekly 
during CORE operation meetings to review enforcement strategies and current crime 
statistical information. Prior to the implementation of CORE, communication and crime 
reduction strategies lacked collaborative communication and effort between the various 
units within the organization. In measuring the department’s CORE success, a variety of 
indicators, or performance measures, are reviewed and discussed during bi-weekly 
command staff CORE meetings. The first indicator is evaluating crime rates before, 
during, and after CORE initiatives to determine what, if any, policing strategies were 
effective. The primary goal of this evaluation is to determine, if possible, the correlation 
between the strategy and an increase or decrease of crime within the targeted area. The 
second indicator is public response to the targeted policing strategies. The internal and 
external communication process before, during, and after the CORE initiative is reviewed 
to ensure the communication process with employees and the public are effective to 
maximize current and future collaboration efforts.  
Appendix D consists of a departmental memorandum authored by the patrol 
division’s major at the conclusion of the organization’s efforts to reduce crime and 
disorder in the targeted geographic area. The previous information proves that through a 
collaborative platform, precise communication and community partnership, the 
Independence Missouri Police Department can adopt a new program with a high 




major agencies, not only face day-to-day crime and disorder concerns, but now acts of 
terrorism and fear associated with such threats, weave into U.S. society and plague 
departments with increased demand and workload with limited resources.  
C.  ANALYSIS: UK: NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING MODEL AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION  
During a review of successful strategies employed by other nations, this 
researcher discovered a concept engaged by the United Kingdom termed Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams (NPTs) and Police Community Support Officers (PSCOs). The 
integration of this policing model may prove beneficial to non-major law enforcement 
agencies. Specifically, this comparative policy strategy analysis focuses on which 
strategies the United Kingdom employs to build relationships with the community in the 
reduction of crime/disorder and how this strategy can strengthen the U.S. policing model.  
According to a UK report entitled, Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy: 
Next Steps in Neighbourhood Policing, the neighbourhood [sic] policing model is helping 
the United Kingdom engage crime issues in its communities. The report states, “Through 
positive engagement, neighbourhood [sic] policing teams can encourage people to come 
forward with information to help keep their own neighbourhood [sic] safe-community 
intelligence that is critical in combating, for instance, organized crime or terrorism” 
(Home Office, 2010, p. 12). According to the United Kingdom, this form of community 
policing enables accessibility to the people and the platform that engages the community 
to work on local crime and disorder (Bullock, 2010). Furthermore, the PSCOs should be 
accountable to the local people so that feedback provides answers to the police on its 
effectiveness (Bullock, 2010).  
Implementing the UK community-policing model into the CORE and COPS 
strategies affords opportunities to build a relationship with officers and the community. 
Building relationships will increase trust of the community to discuss crime and disorder 
issues occurring within the neighborhoods. The UK PSCO team concept increases 
positive officer/citizen contact in which the community desires, strengthen community 
and agency collaboration efforts and provide opportunities for citizens to report 
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suspicious activity with a nexus to terrorist activity. As noted in the United Kingdom, this 
model of policing also serves as a measuring stick to determine if the tactics and 
strategies are effective (Savage, 2007).  
According to the July 2010 UK government document, Strategy Policing in the 
21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People, the United Kingdom vows to 
strengthen the police and community relationship by transferring power back to people 
(Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2010). The strategy calls for bringing the 
people and the police together in a unified effort to fight crime and anti-social behavior 
(Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2010). Furthermore, the UK strategy plan 
calls for regular beat [sic] meetings held by the police for the public with the goal to 
increase police accountability and citizen’s access to the police, and improve the police’s 
transparency (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2010).  
Citizen involvement in the CORE and COPS process will add yet another 
dimension in the intelligence led policing with the potential to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the allocation of manpower and target-oriented policing strategies.  
Police agencies failing to facilitate community input/opinion when making 
policing strategy decisions lack the avenue for immediate feedback from the citizens 
regarding issues they want addressed in their neighborhoods. Police departments that 
build trust and cooperation of the community experience significant reductions in crime 
rates (Byxbe & Carlan, 2001).  
A review of the July 2010, Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and 
People, reveals a radical reform by the government to shift the policing power from a 
bureaucratic accountability system to a democratic accountability system; giving power 
back to the people to oversee and direct police services (Home Office, 2010). This 
document, produced by the UK government's Home Office, provides strategy 
implications that non-major law enforcement agencies can incorporate to strengthen 
community-oriented policing concepts of law enforcement agencies. 
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Strategy goals include increasing opportunities for the public to share information 
with uniformed police officers working the streets on a daily basis. In this report, Home 
Secretary Theresa May states, “Our plans will make the police more accountable, 
accessible and transparent to the public and therefore make our communities safer. 
Regular beat meetings will allow people to challenge the police’s performance and 
accessible ‘street level’ crime data will shine a light on local crime trends and concerns” 
(Home Office, 2010, p. 3).  
The foundation of success for the United Kingdom and the Independence 
Missouri Police Department is a direct partnership of police officials working with the 
community and providing a collaborative environment to ensure safety and rights of all 
citizens. Consistent data collection and review of this data will provide direction for the 
department so that decisions can be made.  
The UK strategy of placing PCSOs within the community bridges the current 
communication gap by directly connecting citizens with front line police officers. 
Furthermore, implementing the UK policing model provides law enforcement executives 
with the opportunity to incorporate PCSOs as the department’s TLO. A department 
appointed TLO’s responsibilities include working with line staff identify terrorism related 
situations and share intelligence related to terrorism, serve as the point-of-contact within 
the agency for questions and information regarding terrorism, and terrorism related leads 
and tips, and building a working relationship with the local fusion center to help facilitate 
information/intelligence to and from field personnel. Training for TLO officers is 
typically provided free of charge through local fusion centers or coordinated by 
professional organizations, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
Non-major agencies are not limited on how many TLO officers to deploy within the 
department; each agency can decide individually on the number of TLO officers it will 
need for successful implementation.  
When organizations are limited in personnel resources, the department can 
leverage the PCSOs trust with the community so that timely information is received on 
possible terrorist activity. The PCSOs can provide education and training to the citizens 
regarding homeland security prevention and reporting suspicious activity observed within 
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their community, and thereby, increase the reporting of crime, and the intervention and 
identification of potential terrorists. A recent story cited in the February 2011 The Police 
Chief magazine provides evidence of leveraging the community’s assistance:  
Due to outreach to storage facility employees by a fusion center, an 
employee noticed something unusual while working at a self-storage 
facility and contacted the police. The police ran checks and found that the 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force had an active investigation and the 
individuals associated with the storage unit were currently under 
surveillance. Two weeks after reporting the activity, four men were 
arrested for plotting to detonate explosives near a synagogue and 
conspiring to shoot down with stinger missiles military planes located at a 
National Guard Base. (Keyer & Miller, 2011, p. 40) 
The United Kingdom and American community policing models are similar in 
that they both rely on community involvement to reduce crime and disorder. The UK 
neighbourhood strategy involves placing officers within their different communities to 
enable their police officers to have a better understanding of the various cultures that 
comprise their communities (Home Office, 2010). This cultural awareness will provide 
officers with a better understanding of the citizens whom they serve while providing 
insight on how to communicate effectively, educate and increase problem-solving efforts. 
Since officers are dealing with the people within their own community, a program such 
as the one adopted in the United Kingdom could be successful no matter where it is 
implemented. It directly correlates with the officer’s ability to establish trust within the 
community. This trust will directly impact a program’s acceptance within the 
neighborhood, and allow for increased information exchange between the police and the 
community.  
In the strategy report entitled, Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy: Next 
Steps in Neighbourhood Policing, several UK strategies can be implemented to engage 
citizen and strengthen collaboration with the police agency. The following strategies, 
taken from Chapter III of the Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy, entitled 
“Engaging Communities” [sic], provide consideration by U.S. law enforcement agencies 
(Home Office, 2010, pp. 38–40).  
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3. 15  The public should be asked what issues matter to them most so 
services can be provided which are more responsive to local people 
and therefore satisfactory and efficient.  
3. 18 The public should also be able to influence how services are 
delivered “In England and Whales there are now ‘Councillor [sic] 
Calls for Action’ and Overview and Scrutiny Committees, which 
are made up of councillors [sic]and are responsible for scrutinising 
[sic] the council’s executive and other local public service 
providers on behalf of the public. In England, the Government is 
enabling members of the public and community groups to be co-
opted on onto Overview and Scrutiny Committees which deal with 
crime and disorder issues.  
3. 22 To be confident and able to play a full role in their own 
neighbourhood’s [sic] safety “As well as influencing and 
challenging how services are delivered, this could be giving up 
some of their time to play a role keeping their neighbourhood safe 
and confident or be as simple as reporting crime and ASB (Anti-
Social Behavior) when they see it and acting responsibly. ” 
The foundation of the UK neighbourhood [sic] policing strategies are based on, 
“A clear agreement at a neighbourhood [sic] level between the public and services; a 
signed agreement of both interest groups” (Home Office, 2010, p. 41). The Safe and 
Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy pledges the benefits of this approach to policing is 
that it strengthens the country’s counterterrorism strategy, also known as “PREVENT,” 
in that this relationship building allows for a trusted exchange of information between the 
citizen and the police and encourages the public and partners to engage acts of violent 
extremism (Home Office, 2010). Similar to what is being experienced witth the CORE 
process within the Indepenence Missouri Police Department, the UK model of policing is 
founded on building trust and communication with the community. Unreported incidents 
of crime, disorder, and suspicious activity will negatively impact law enforcement 
agencies’ ability to detect and deter potential acts of terrorism.  
Six years following the implementation of neighbourhood [sic] teams in the 
United Kingdom, the country has experienced a 92% public approval rating (Home 
Office, 2010). The Safe and Confident Neighbourhood Strategy posits a variety of 
stratagems to measure the success of the PCSOs within the communities. Strategy 1.25 
(Figure 4) states that the public should expect the following from their PCSO program. 
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Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy: 1.25 
Neighbourhood policing teams that know who is vulnerable and who is an offender or 
suspect on their patch 
Neighbourhood policing teams that are involved in the planning and aftermath of other 
police activity 
Neighbourhood policing teams that have the confidence of their communities and can 
relay community concerns and intelligence to other parts of the force 
A wider police force which knows what the local concerns are when they work in a 
neighbourhood, and how their activity can contribute towards addressing them 
All members of the police treating people courteously, fairly and with respect as 
promised in the Policing Pledge 
 
Figure 4.   Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy: 1.25. (From: Home Office, 
2010, p. 17) 
Non-major police agencies that implement the PCSO strategy within their 
respected jurisdictions should consider a similar strategy to ensure that the PCSO 
program is meeting expectations of the organization and the community alike. An 
independent review and analysis of the UK neighbourhood policing strategy was 
conducted by Karen Bullock in January, 2010. Bullock assessed the UK’s neighbourhood 
strategy pledge in specific areas of the programs objectives. Subsequently, Bullock’s 
assessment provides an accountability framework for non-major agencies to adopt within 
their own PCSO program. (Figure 5) 
Provide details of the neighbourhood policing team personnel, where they are based, 
how to contact them and how to work with them 
Arrange regular public meetings to agree priorities, at least once a month 
Provide monthly updates on progress in dealing with the priorities and on local 
crime and policing issues. This should be provided at neighbourhood meetings, on 
the web and via a detailed newsletter delivered quarterly to each household 
Provide web-based maps along with data about crime in an area 
Respond to every message directed to the neighbourhood policing team within 24 
hours 
Figure 5.   Accountability Framework for Non-Major Agencies to Adopt. (From: 
Bullock, 2010) 
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This strong community and police department alliance sends a strong message to 
criminals and terrorists; if they choose to engage in unlawful activity, they will be 
identified and prosecuted for their actions. Communicating stories with the press on how 
the community/police partnership positively impacts crime and disorder within the 
community will increase the perception of a safe and resilient community for the citizens 
and neighboring cities alike (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Sharing success stories 
on how the community/police relationship reduces crime and disorder within the 
community provides citizens with the confidence that they can work with the police to 
resolve issues while reducing the fear of retaliation from offenders. Building trust and 
communication between the community and the police increases the police department’s 
ability to strengthen collaboration efforts desired in building a strong homeland security 
strategy with U.S. communities.  
D.  UK STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS  
Formal agreements signed by the law enforcement agency and the community 
may be a consideration to strengthen community collaboration. One advantage of a 
formal agreement with the community is that this process ensures two-way 
communication between the community and the LE agency. Providing two distinct 
attributes; first, this form of agreement can further leverage the community to impact 
crime and disorder, and second, this process will fill the desire of the community by 
providing interaction with police officers (Bullock, 2010).  
When considering the implementation of UK strategies, the organization must 
consider three primary issues. First, if the organization chooses to implement signing 
agreements with the community, how will the organization market the product to 
encourage citizen and business owners to participate? It is imperative that the 
organization consider a marketing strategy to increase the number of businesses and 
citizens that participate. Secondly, the police department must consider how the 
organization responds to the program when the personnel resources of the police 
department are already stretched. If the organization chooses to implement signed  
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agreements with the community, a system providing timely feedback and response from 
the organization will be critical. Finally, due to budget constraints, no additional 
personnel must be required to perform additional strategies.  
Although LE agencies continually make valiant efforts to bridge communications 
with the community and reduce crime and disorder, the success of these applications 
typically fail to address public desire for increased citizen contact with police officers. 
For the future success of community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, 
implementing select UK strategies will assist LE agencies in seaming the current gap 
with the community, businesses and the police department.  
The implementation of this strategy can start with the process of selecting a 
community/police committee, using selected members of the organization and 
community leaders, to determine the feasibility of full or partial implementation of the 
selected UK strategies. This committee will be charged with developing organizational 
policy and procedures, goals and a marketing strategy to engage the community into the 
process. This committee’s responsibilities will include an in-depth organizational analysis 
to determine if current resources within the organization can be tasked with the additional 
responsibilities.  
Forming this community/police committee will promote increased 
communications and transparencies with the public. This committee concept provides 
additional opportunities to problem solve the needs of the department and the 
community. Publicizing information from these committee meetings on an ongoing basis 
will strengthen vertical and horizontal communications while increasing transparency and 
collaboration with the community. This committee shall establish policy and procedures 
addressing formal agreements with the community to address crime and disorder, 
establish guidelines for citizen to attend bi-weekly public meetings and establish 
guidelines for conducting monthly public quadrant meetings. The goal of this committee 
is to assess the viability of implementing successful UK policing strategies into the 
organization’s intelligence led policing efforts.  
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Another helpful strategy would be to develop and distribute press releases 
advising the public that the police department will conduct monthly quadrant meetings. 
The monthly quadrant meetings information might be comprised of crime reporting 
summaries for that time period and could serve several purposes. First, these meetings 
would give current crime statistics to the citizens to allow them to remain informed of 
what is occurring in their community. Secondly, the quadrant meetings can provide team-
building decisions to determine joint crime prevention strategies with the community to 
address identified crime trends and provide a platform to discuss homeland security 
programs with the community. This combination of strategies will increase citizen 
awareness and organizational transparency and are essential building blocks in 
implementing a new program within an organization focused upon citizen involvement to 
aid in keeping police aware of community concerns so manpower can be minimal yet 
effective.  
Another helpful strategy would be to learn how to apply PCSO strategies within 
their assigned areas of responsibility and would enhance communication within the 
department and community. This strategy development could start with command staff 
members conducting a full analysis of how officers are deployed within the community 
to meet the identified goals developed collaboratively with valued stakeholders.  
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V.  LOW COST TECHNOLOGY: FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES 
TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY COLLABORATION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
In addition to the positive impact the UK model has proven to public 
communities, the Independence Missouri Police Department has witnessed and 
documented powerful results with the implementation of CORE and COPS. Technology 
has been able to marry the past with the present brilliantly. Technology provides a citizen 
everyday access to what is happening in the community and allows police officials to 
document and view properly a much larger scope of what types of crime and disorder are 
occurring within the community, which allows the police department to be more efficient 
and effective in keeping citizens safe.  
Technology continues to change and provide faster and more detailed services. If 
non-major police departments adopt a program to increase homeland security, technology 
serves as a fundamental piece in this process. It is essential that specific procedures and 
policies be in place to enter data correctly, quickly, and efficiently so that surrounding 
agencies, as well as major agencies, could view the data and make accurate and timely 
responses. CrimeReports.com downloads crime statistic information directly from the 
CAD program to allow citizens to view current crime information from their personal 
computers. Citizens can also choose to receive email alerts advising them of crime 
activity near their homes or businesses. Figure 6 shows an example of what a citizen can 
view on the computer. This map depicts what crimes occurred in a selected area. Clicking 
on the various icons will provide specific information on what crime was committed, 
when it was reported and the related police report number taken.  
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Figure 6.   Current Crime Information. (From: Crime Reports, n.d.).  
This service meets the need of police department’s expectations in delivering 
timely crime statistics to enable citizens to act appropriately with the information. 
However, this form of social networking conflicts with the personal two-way interaction 
that the community voiced as a desire during town hall meetings.  
During the early months of 2010, Independence Missouri Police Department 
command staff members attended town hall meetings across the community. The goal of 
the town hall meetings was to ask the community what expectations it has of police. It 
was the intent of police to present challenges that the police department faces on a day-
to-day basis to the community.  
During each of these town hall meetings, the citizens voiced a strong desire for 
increased personal contact with uniformed police officers. Although the police 
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department implemented new strategies and technology, such as Twitter and Facebook, 
to bridge the communication gap, it remains apparent that additional strategies must be 
explored to meet community expectations. Consideration must be given when asking the 
community for assistance and then failing to provide sufficient means. In many LE 
agencies across the nation, community interaction with police usually only occurs when a 
citizen or business calls the police department and requests an officer respond due to an 
issue of concern or simply by a chance meeting with a police officer patrolling in the 
community.  
Due to the resource limitations of local police departments as addressed above, it 
is nearly impossible for officers of non-major departments to be in every neighborhood at 
all times. Solutions to crime and disorder issues are generally not found within the 
criminal justice system; it is the efforts of the community (Scott & Goldstein, 2005). The 
police department recognizes that the future successes of intelligence-led policing efforts 
depend largely on the agency's ability to collaborate with the citizens and businesses 
located within the community (Byxbe & Carlan, 2001).  
In an effort to bridge this gap, the Independence Missouri Police Department 
implemented Web 2.0 technology as a means to address this need. During the town hall 
meetings, citizen comments revealed that the community desires additional means of 
two-way communication with the police. To determine what, if any, technology 
applications exist to strengthen community collaboration with little or no cost and 
without increasing personnel resources, the goal derived from this meeting entailed 
researching current Web 2.0 applications and to provide strategy recommendations to 
strengthen the organizations information sharing and collaboration capabilities with the 
community utilizing available Web 2.0 technologies.  
To start this process, command staff members investigated improved methods to 
record crime statistics for the purpose of responding to and addressing crime and disorder 
problems within the community. Budget constraints placed on the police department 
demanded that any technology application considerations be limited to off the shelf 
availability and relatively inexpensive.  
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The command staff concluded that applying affordable technology within 
intelligence-led policing concepts are critical in accomplishing the Independence 
Missouri Police Department mission, to reduce crime and disorder using the processes of 
CORE and COPS with the assistance of available technology. Non-major police 
departments rely heavily upon officers to interact effectively within their community. 
Technology is yet another strategy to aid in successful police enforcement, but it will 
never replace human interaction. Technology, community involvement, and proactive 
police work provide a framework, which is reliant upon each other. The police and the 
citizens share ownership of the community problem (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). 
Although some crime and disorder can be addressed solely by the police, other problems 
require community-led efforts (Goldstein & Susmilch, 1981). Police serve as the 
enforcement element of this effort. The Independence Missouri Police Department 
believes the quality of life within each neighborhood results from a vested interest from 
both the police and the community. The community must work with the district officer 
familiar with that area.  
The Independence Missouri Police Department is now asking the citizens and 
businesses to help by becoming involved in their communities. With the limited 
resources available to the police department, it is impossible for officers to be in every 
neighborhood at all times. The citizens who live in these neighborhoods can gather 
information about crime and disorder issues and pass it along to responding officers. 
Recording license plate numbers, noting accurate vehicle or suspect descriptions, and 
taking photographs can be a tremendous help in the successful identification and 
prosecution of offenders. This collaborative effort with the community provides 
opportunities to identify potential terrorist activity occurring within the community.  
B.  ANALYSIS  
The police department’s limited success with the implementation of Web 2.0 
technology requires further consideration. The organization’s use of 
www.CrimeReports.com and www.twitter.com should continue. Web 2.0 technologies 
may provide additional tools to further the department’s efforts in strengthening the 
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organization’s way of sharing information and collaborating with the community. Both 
are essential elements in the future success of the department’s intelligence-led policing 
efforts. It is imperative that the police department provide the appropriate tools for the 
community and business owners to communicate effectively with the police. The police 
department is asking the community for assistance but failing to provide sufficient means 
leaves everyone possibly to fail the goal of citizen safety and increased collaboration. The 
current Web 2.0 application used by the organization does not provide a seamless process 
for two-way communication with the public. Improved methods of technology must be 
sought to enhance the non-major law enforcement’s ability to strengthen collaboration 
with the community. Identifying and implementing technology for little, or no cost, can 
increase the likelihood that citizens will report suspicious activity or criminal activity that 
may have a nexus to terrorism.  
During this review of available Web 2.0 options, the discovery of a new social 
networking program called Neighborhood Central, produced by CrimeReports, may 
prove beneficial to LE agencies facing similar collaboration barriers (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.   Neighborhood Central. (From: Crime Reports, n.d.) 
Founder and CEO of CrimeReports, Greg Whisenant, states, “Our goal from 
inception has been to provide a tool that connects people with their local law enforcement 
agency to share information and easily communicate with each other. The unique 
dialogue Neighborhood Central provides enables citizens to play a direct, personal role in 
public safety and extend the reach of law enforcement agencies to serve communities 
more efficiently and effectively” (Crime Reports, 2010, News Section). Furthermore, 
Whisenant states, “Neighborhood Central facilitates a secure dialogue between citizens 
and law enforcement about local crime activity and community policing efforts, making 
it easier for users to take an active role in making their community safer. The new utility 
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will leverage mobile devices and established social networks to keep users connected and 
informed” (Crime Reports, 2010, News Section). Timely, accurate crime reporting and 
notification enables both officers of the agecny and the community an accurate picture of 
what crime and disorder is occurring within the community. Timely, accurate crime 
reporting enables agencies to identify crime patterns or patterns of suspicous activity. 
Both of these identififors enable the agency and community to collaborate efforts in 
solving problems.  
As LE agencies consider opportunities to strengthen information sharing and 
collaboration capabilities, Neighborhood Central should be specifically reviewed to 
determine if this program meets the need of the organization. This Web 2.0 technology 
provides a web-based platform providing two-way communication between the 
community and the police officers who serve them.  
If LE agencies consider implementation of Web 2.0 technology, the organization 
should consider three primary concerns. First, if the organization chooses to subscribe to 
this new social networking technology, how will the organization market the product to 
encourage more citizens and businesses to participate than that found with other forms of 
Web 2.0 technology? It is imperative that organizations consider the implementation of a 
marketing strategy to increase the number of end users. Secondly, the police department 
must consider how the organization responds to the information it receives. If an 
organization chooses to implement Neighborhood Central, a system providing timely 
feedback and response from the organization will be critical. Finally, due to budget 
constraints, the technology must be affordable to the organization. Crimereports.com and 
NeighborhoodCentral.com base the annual service on the size of the police agency. For 
example, for an agency the size of the City of Independence, Missouri, both 
Crimereports.com and NeighborhoodCentral.com services can be purchased yearly for 
fewer than $5,000. Crimereports.com provides computer generated crime statistical 
information saving hundreds of manhours per year in crime data collection.  
Although the Independence Missouri Police Department made an effort to use 
Web 2.0 technologies, the current utilization and success of these applications is 
extremely limited. The means of bringing the community, businesses, and the police 
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department together is essential to a police department’s intelligence-led process. Even 
though non-major law enforcement agencies do not have the federal funding or 
manpower, they cannot ignore the importance of community involvement. Community 
involvement is critical to established programs that focus on building collaboration.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The need for homeland security is not going away. As a leader within a police 
agency, it is critical to the safety of the community and all citizens within it to be 
afforded the right to live in a terror free world. The security of the nation depends on a 
united homeland security program; the problem is money to fund such programs. The 
economy today does not warrant any business or organization to spend money freely 
without being able to prove its worth. Every agency must be creative with resources and 
achieve goals with what they have available. Non-major police departments have to take 
this one step further because federal funding is available. Resources have to be carefully 
deployed and decisions must be based upon successful evaluation of data, which is not 
only smart practice, but also enhances trust between the community and local law 
enforcement.  
The UK policing model has been successful and provided the necessary 
framework in implementing the strategy that is in place. The Independence Missouri 
Police Department has documented success with the implementation of CORE and 
COPS. These two models provide a starting point for future homeland security programs. 
Incorporating TLOs in a department and providing SAR reporting as the way of 
documenting areas of concern, can be implemented by any non-major agency with little 
to no cost.  
Pieces of a very dynamic puzzle are continually discovered, which reveals an 
uncertain future. Finding the correct puzzle piece takes time and resources. Homeland 
security is a vital piece that must be properly placed within every department. It is a piece 
that deserves respect. It is a piece that is not going away.  
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APPENDIX A. CORE CRIME STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
(FROM DACHENHAUSEN, 2010) 
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE OF CORE ACTIVITY REPORTING 
 
 CORE Activity 
 
CORE Issue Description: Hawthorne & Susquehanna Ridge Area-PROPERTY 
CRIMES 
CORE Number: 2010-04 
 
 
Date: 4/23/2010 Division/Unit: B-Watch 
Patrol 
Officer: Capt. D. Thompson 
Core 10-4P. O. Dorman conducted two ped checks on subjects walking aimlessly in the 
core area:Mxxxxxx, Brandon L. wm, xx/xx/xx, 1523 Manor Circle - Arrested on 
warrants.  
Dxxxxx, Zachary, R. w/m xx/xx/xx, 3201 N. Liberty.  
Date: 4/23/2010 Division/Unit: D-Watch 
Patrol 
Officer: Sgt. B. Vaughan 
The CORE project was busy tonight. P. O. Lane and P. O. Syme conducted pro-active 
foot patrol in the CORE area. They found an open window at 719 Dover Dr. and 
discovered 719 had copper theft damage that was un-reported. They also found two other 
doors in that proximity that was also unsecured.  
Date: 4/24/2010 Division/Unit: B-Watch 
Patrol 
Officer: Capt. D. Thompson 
Officer Dorman and Jarnagin were conducting foot patrol in Hawthorne Apartments and 
detected strong odor of Marijuana emanating from 607 Dover Drive Apt. 1-B. Conducted 
residence check. Made 5-warrant arrests. Residents name Bryan xxx, B/M, DOB 
xx/xx/xx. Report to be forwarded to management for follow-up.  
Date: 4/29/2010 Division/Unit: B-Watch 
Patrol 
Officer: Capt. D. Thompson 
Officer Dorman conducted 2-Ped checks people out roaming around.  
1. Axxx,Larry D. w/m xx/xx/xx 617 W. South.  




2. Txxxxxx,Earnest D. b/m xx/xx/xx 16839 E. 5th St.  
Txxxxxx gave his sisters residence - but he doesn't stay there… no other address to give.  
He stated that he is taking free GED classes that are given at the Hawthorne office.  
  
One car stop and a summons issued.  
Date: 4/29/2010 Division/Unit: D-Watch Officer: PO Stetzler / PO Coale 
Car check at 5th and Jennings. (#10-38950) Tyler E. Bxxxx arrested for Traffic Violations 
as well as Narcotics and Parties.  
Date: 5/1/2020 Division/Unit: A-Watch Officer: J. Onka 
Robbery reported at 17111 E 24 Hwy. Report taken, scene processed by P. O. Onka. 
Detectives notified. Suspect description: male white plaid shorts and a white and black 
jacket, face covered with a white bandana armed with a silver in color handgun.  
 
Date: 5/2/2010 Division/Unit: A-Watch  Officer: P. O. Head/Cole 
Ped check 24Hwy Concord - Samuel Wxxx w/m xx/xx/xx1305 N. Osage. Auto Theft 
subject10-39889 
Date: 5/2/2010 Division/Unit: A-Watch Officer: P. O. Head/Cole 
Car stop Jake Hxxxxxx w/m xx/xx/xx.  
Date: 5/4/2010 Division/Unit: D-Watch Officer: PO Lane 
Ped check Hawthorne Apartments - Suspicious Subject, Wilfred E. Sxxxx, b/m, xx/xx/xx, 
was arrested on warrants. #10-40387 
Date: 5/4/2010 Division/Unit: D-Watch Officer: PO Syme / PO Schmidli & 
Others 
0218 hours Armed Robbery at 7-11, 17801 E. 24 Hwy. which resulted in a car chase and 
apprehension of the suspect of this robbery and a previous Armed Robbery at 12333 E. 
40 Hwy. this same night. Reports #10-40389 & #10-40383.  
Date: 5/5/2010 Division/Unit: C-Watch Officer: Officer Shaw 
Officer Shaw conducted patrol in the Cler-mont Elementary School parking lot. Once 
there, he found a suspicious occupied vehicle. After contact with the driver, Paul 
Bxxxxxx a search was conducted due to a purported marijuana odor. Subsequent to the 
search, Officer Shaw found approximately 17 grams of marijuana. Reference report 10-
41042 
Date: 5/6/2010 Division/Unit: C Watch Officer: Waterworth 
ETS activation on the Bait Car, at 639 N. Dover. The computer in which the ETS was 
attached to was taken. The activation led him to 615 N. Peck, where the stolen computer 
was located and two taken into custody. 2010-41375 
Suspect 1: Kxxxxxx, David N. Jr. BM xx/xx/xx 
Suspect 2: Mxxxx, Jose, L. BM xx/xx/xx 
Date: 5/7/2010 Division/Unit: C Watch Officer: Waterworth 
He observed a vehicle pulling out from behind the closed businesses at 908 N. Atherton. 
Seconds later, the ETS at that location went off. The vehicle was stopped and two 
subjects were identified. They were in possession of bolt cutters, snips, voltage meters, 
pole climbing straps and other items used to steal copper. It is believed that they were in 
the process of stealing copper, when JACO Sheriff’s Dept. was in pursuit just north of the 
location, most likely startling them. They were arrested for the possession of the burglary 
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tools. 2010-41428 
Suspect 1: Cxxxxx, Matthew D WM xx/xx/xx 
Suspect 2: Mxxxxxx, Thomas J WM xx/xx/xx 
Suspect Vehicle: 94 Ford F150, Missouri license xxxxxx 
Date: 5/6/2010 Division/Unit: Invest. A Officer: Det. Stewart 
On 05-06-10 Det. Stewart deployed the bait car with an active ETS system on a laptop 
computer in front of the address of 639 Dover Dr., At approximately 2139 hrs. Dispatch 
and officers received an ETS activation from the bait car. Officer did a great job and 
followed the device to the address of 615 N. Peck Ct. where the laptop was located and 
two suspects were apprehended. Both suspect gave their statements/confessions but only 
admitted to this only larceny from auto. The main suspect, David Kxxxxxx, is residing at 
the address of 638 Dover Dr. with a Heather Bxxxxxx. Just in case there is pattern in that 
area.  
Date: 5/8/2010 Division/Unit: D-Watch Officer: PO Showman & PO Abraham 
Car check involving Tyler Mxxxxx (16 yrs), Michael Wxxx (17 yrs) and Carlton Hxxxxx 
(20 yrs) taken into custody for narcotics and alcohol violations. Rpt #10-42115.  
Date: 5/16/2010 Division/Unit: C Watch Officer: Spade 
2010-44380 
Location: 600 S. M291 Highway (Benfer's Tow lot) 
Suspect: Bxxxxxxxxx, Cassandra M WF xx/xx/xx 
Suspect: Sxxxx, Christopher A WM xx/xx/xx 
Both suspects were caught inside the Benfer Tow lot, stealing a car stereo. A search of 
their vehicle, that was park outside the fence, yielded a small amount of drugs.  
Date: 5/15/2010 Division/Unit: A Watch Officer: Marriott 
2010-44279  
Location: 16801 E. 24 Hwy (Quiktrip) 
Suspect #1: Unknown 
Suspect #2: Sxxxxx, Kenneth J. W/M, xx/xx/xx 
Officers were dispatched to the area of Frederick and College when an individual called 
911 advising they were following their father in law’s stolen vehicle. Officer Mariott 
located the stolen auto at 24 Hwy and Kiger and began following it waiting on additional 
units. When the stolen auto arrived at the Quiktrip, 24 Hwy and Dover, the driver pulled 
into the lot, bailed out of the vehicle and ran behind the business and in to the area of the 
Hawthorne Apartments. Officer Marriott took the passenger into custody without 
incident. Additional officers conducted an area check for the driver with negative results. 
Kenneth J. Sxxxxxx was booked on Tamper II.  
Date: 5/11/2010 Division/Unit: C Watch Officer: Waterworth 
2010-42961 
Location: 24 Hwy and Concord Circle 
Suspect: Rxxxxx, Tony A. B/M xx/xx/xx 
Officer Waterworth conducted a car check on a white Pontiac Grand Prix after learning 
the vehicles owner,Tony Rxxxxx, had numerous outstanding warrants. The car check was 
conducted as the vehicle was entering the apartment complex. Tony Rxxxxx was arrested 
on his 13 outstanding warrants.  
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Date: 5/30/2010 Division/Unit: A Watch  Officer: Head/Cole 
Car Stop 539 Dover: Lionel Fxxxxx B/M xx/xx/xx 5820 Prospect was arrested on 
KCMO warrants.  
Date: 5/30/2010 Division/Unit: A Watch Officer: Head/Cole 
Residence check 2001 Concord Circle for Dorovan Cxxxxxxx w/m xx/xx/xx reference 
stop order for statutory rape. Apartment was found to be vacant with an eviction notice 
posted 5/29/10.  
  
Date: 5/30/2010 Division/Unit: A Watch  Officer: Head/Cole 
Kelsie R Pxxxxxxxx w/f xx/xx/xx (Homeless) with 3. 7 grams of methamphetamine 
during a car stop near 1901 Concord Circle.  
Date: 6/1/2010 Division/Unit: B-Watch  Officer: Capt. D. Thompson 
CORE 10-04Concord / Hawthorne Area 
Officers Pope, Colbert and Dorman conducted directed foot and vehicle patrol in the 
CORE area between calls.  
 
3 Car Stops 
2 Ped Checks 
5 Moving Violations 
1 Seat Belt 
1 Arrest Suspended License 
1 Tagged Hazardous Vehicle  
Date: 6/1/2010 Division/Unit: G. R. I. T.  Officer: Minter 
Detective Minter conducted the following pro-active activity in Hawthorne:  
(6) vehicle checks 
(3) traffic summons 
(2) FI Reports (#2010-50276) & (#2010-50249) 
(1) pedestrian check (#2010-50265) 
During the pro-active assignment, I was able to identify (2) gang members who were 
observed leaving the area of Concorde Circle.  
  
I initiated a traffic stop on a black 1991 Lexus LS400 (bearing Missouri license plate 
#xxxxxx) and identified the driver as Dwain L. Txxxxx, B/M, DOB xx/xx/xx. Txxxxx 
was identified as a prior (97th Street East Coast Crip). Report FI #10-50249 
  
I initiated a pedestrian check in the area of 24 Hwy. and Dover Drive (Quik Trip) as a 
subject was observed “jay walking” without using the designated cross walk. He was 
identified as Eric D. Lxxxx, B/M, DOB xx/xx/xx and was subsequently arrested for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana and prescription pills). He was also 
identified as leaving the area of Concorde Circle and identified as a (43rd Street Crip). 
Report #2010-50265 (Drug Violation) & (FI) #2010-50276.  
Date: 6/2/2010 Division/Unit: G. R. I. T.  Officer: Minter/Winborn 
Detective(s) Minter and Winborn worked CORE #10-04. During the operation the 
following was conducted: 
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(6) vehicle stops 
(1) residence check looking for Kevin Fxx w/outstanding warrants 
(3) pedestrian checks 
(4) warrants 
  
There was nothing significant in the Hawthorne area and no calls for service.  
Date: 6/8/2010 Division/Unit: Comm. 
Srvs.  
Officer: Daugherty 
I took a supp to 2010-52488. This was a 1st degree res burg. I recovered most of the 
stolen property and took one of the 2 suspects into custody. The property was recovered 
from 16831 and 16833 E 5th St N. The suspect, Dylan M. Mxxxxxx, W/M, xx/xx/xx, 
lives at 16831 E 5th St N with his mother. The second suspect, Jeremy W. Bxxxxxx, 
W/M, xx/xx/xx, lives at 16833 E 5th St N with his sister. He isn't in custody yet. The 
recovered property was valued at over $1000.  
Date: 6/12/2010 Division/Unit: C-Watch Officer: Capt. Thurman 
Officers conducted foot patrol in Hawthorne area while limited time permitted. Officers 
were highly visible with lots of ped foot traffic. Officers made two arrests with warrants, 
summons and illegal substances recovered. Only able to spend approximately 1 hour in 
the area.  
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APPENDIX C. TRACKING OF TIME SPENT IN CORE INITIATIVE 
AREA 
 DATE DISPOSITION # UNIT CALL CALL CLEARED TOTAL DISPATCHDISPATCH INCIDENT TYPE
4/25 Core 1004 201000037393117 4/25/2010 10:24:07 11:07:55 1:05:05 4/25/2010 10:24:07 CAR CHECK
4/27 Core 1004 201000038191K91 4/27/2010 19:52:27 0:06:57 3:06:10 4/27/2010 19:52:27 Traff ic Enforcement
4/27 Core 1004 201000038191315 4/27/2010 19:52:27 0:06:57 3:06:10 4/27/2010 19:52:27 Traff ic Enforcement
4/27 Core 1004 201000038204316 4/27/2010 20:31:47 20:38:15 0:06:28 4/27/2010 20:31:47 CAR CHECK
4/27 Core 1004 201000038191311 4/27/2010 19:52:27 0:06:57 3:06:10 4/27/2010 19:52:27 Traff ic Enforcement
4/27 Core 1004 201000038191316 4/27/2010 19:52:27 0:06:57 3:06:10 4/27/2010 19:52:27 Traff ic Enforcement
4/27 Core 1004 201000038191313 4/27/2010 19:52:27 0:06:57 3:06:10 4/27/2010 19:52:27 Traff ic Enforcement
4/27 Core 1004 201000037940200 4/27/2010 2:55:35 4:40:30 1:44:55 4/27/2010 2:55:35 Directed Patrol
4/27 Core 1004 201000037925214 4/27/2010 0:35:02 1:34:16 0:59:14 4/27/2010 0:35:02 Directed Patrol
4/27 Core 1004 201000037925216 4/27/2010 0:35:02 1:34:16 0:59:14 4/27/2010 0:35:02 Directed Patrol
4/28 Core 1004 201000038613216 4/28/2010 22:39:29 22:43:18 0:03:49 4/28/2010 22:39:29 PEDESTRIAN CHECK
4/28 Core 1004 201000038571311 4/28/2010 20:44:30 21:59:55 1:15:25 4/28/2010 20:44:30 GENERAL INFORMATION REPORT
4/28 Core 1004 201000038421127 4/28/2010 13:51:39 15:27:11 1:35:32 4/28/2010 13:51:39 Directed Patrol
4/28 Core 1004 201000038440127 4/28/2010 14:38:23 14:46:45 0:08:22 4/28/2010 14:38:23 CAR CHECK
4/29 Core 1004 201000038992315 4/29/2010 22:08:15 22:15:25 0:07:10 4/29/2010 22:08:15 PEDESTRIAN CHECK
4/29 Core 1004 201000038936311 4/29/2010 20:01:04 23:58:07 3:57:03 4/29/2010 20:01:04 Directed Patrol
4/29 Core 1004 201000038936315 4/29/2010 20:01:04 23:58:07 3:57:03 4/29/2010 20:01:04 Directed Patrol
4/29 Core 1004 201000038950217 4/29/2010 20:50:18 21:39:08 0:48:50 4/29/2010 20:50:18 CAR CHECK
4/29 Core 1004 201000038936313 4/29/2010 20:01:04 23:58:07 3:57:03 4/29/2010 20:01:04 Directed Patrol
4/29 Core 1004 201000038741110 4/29/2010 10:25:19 10:34:50 0:09:31 4/29/2010 10:25:19 Directed Patrol
4/29 Core 1004 201000038660216 4/29/2010 2:10:41 2:34:30 0:23:49 4/29/2010 2:10:41 CAR CHECK
4/29 Core 1004 201000038659216 4/29/2010 2:01:57 2:05:16 0:03:19 4/29/2010 2:01:57 CAR CHECK
4/29 Core 1004 201000038658216 4/29/2010 1:49:52 1:52:21 0:02:29 4/29/2010 1:49:52 SUSPICIOUS PERSON/ACTIVITY
4/29 Core 1004 201000038657216 4/29/2010 1:43:40 1:44:02 0:00:22 4/29/2010 1:43:40 CAR CHECK
4/30 Core 1004 201000039396200 4/30/2010 22:29:26 22:48:13 0:18:47 4/30/2010 22:29:26 Traff ic Enforcement
4/30 Core 1004 201000039104117 4/30/2010 8:01:09 9:52:18 1:51:09 4/30/2010 8:01:09 Directed Patrol
4/30 Core 1004 201000039086116 4/30/2010 6:32:17 6:36:28 0:04:11 4/30/2010 6:32:17 CAR CHECK
5/1 Core 1004 201000039433K93 5/1/2010 0:14:37 0:53:58 0:39:21 5/1/2010 0:14:37 CAR CHECK
5/1 Core 1004 201000039430216 5/1/2010 0:08:37 0:21:53 0:13:16 5/1/2010 0:08:37 MISC DETAIL
5/6 Core 1004 201000041058214 5/5/2010 23:48:46 0:21:46 9:10:00 5/5/2010 23:48:46 GENERAL INFORMATION REPORT
5/7 Core 1004 201000041757227 5/7/2010 22:53:58 23:01:33 0:07:35 5/7/2010 22:53:58 CAR CHECK
5/7 Core 1004 201000041756217 5/7/2010 22:51:23 22:58:48 0:07:25 5/7/2010 22:51:23 CAR CHECK
5/7 Core 1004 201000041747217 5/7/2010 22:39:39 22:40:20 0:00:41 5/7/2010 22:39:39 CAR CHECK
5/7 Core 1004 201000041721227 5/7/2010 21:42:28 22:05:36 0:23:08 5/7/2010 21:42:28 CAR CHECK
5/7 Core 1004 201000041720227 5/7/2010 21:38:38 1:19:16 4:00:05 5/7/2010 21:38:38 MISC DETAIL
5/7 Core 1004 201000041713227 5/7/2010 21:28:07 21:38:25 0:10:18 5/7/2010 21:28:07 PEDESTRIAN CHECK
5/7 Core 1004 201000041670227 5/7/2010 19:18:02 20:13:01 0:54:59 5/7/2010 19:18:02 MISC DETAIL
5/7 Core 1004 201000041670217 5/7/2010 19:18:02 20:13:01 0:54:59 5/7/2010 19:18:02 MISC DETAIL
5/8 Core 1004 201000042115218 5/8/2010 22:34:15 23:49:04 1:14:49 5/8/2010 22:34:15 CAR CHECK
5/8 Core 1004 201000042099218 5/8/2010 21:47:47 21:54:54 0:07:07 5/8/2010 21:49:01 CAR CHECK
5/8 Core 1004 201000042037227 5/8/2010 18:37:44 20:06:22 1:28:38 5/8/2010 18:37:44 Directed Patrol
5/8 Core 1004 201000042058218 5/8/2010 19:39:46 19:47:17 0:07:31 5/8/2010 19:39:46 CAR CHECK
5/8 Core 1004 201000041812210 5/8/2010 1:11:04 1:55:57 0:44:53 5/8/2010 1:11:04 CAR CHECK
5/8 Core 1004 201000041812210 5/8/2010 1:11:04 1:55:57 0:44:53 5/8/2010 1:11:04 CAR CHECK
5/8 Core 1004 201000041801217 5/8/2010 0:38:22 1:02:07 0:23:45 5/8/2010 0:38:22 CAR CHECK
5/11 Core 1004 201000042974K94 5/11/2010 22:14:52 23:12:56 0:58:04 5/11/2010 22:14:55 Directed Patrol
5/15 Core 1004 201000044154127 5/15/2010 7:57:02 9:18:53 1:21:51 5/15/2010 7:57:02 Directed Patrol
5/15 Core 1004 201000044101K92 5/15/2010 1:41:38 2:39:23 0:57:45 5/15/2010 1:41:38 Directed Patrol
5/16 Core 1004 201000044599K91 5/16/2010 22:59:03 23:37:53 0:38:50 5/16/2010 22:59:03 Directed Patrol
5/16 Core 1004 201000044172116 5/15/2010 9:23:30 13:09:30 3:46:00 5/15/2010 9:23:30 CAR CHASE
116:25:33
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DATE:  June 15, 2010 
  
TO:  Lt. Col. John Main 
 
FROM: Travis Forbes, Major 
  Patrol Division 
 
SUBJECT: CORE Initiative 2010-04 Summary 
 
CORE initiative 2010-04 was started based upon a noticeable increase in property crimes 
within the northeast part of the City.  
 
Initially, the potential offenders were not known, so concentrated patrols were conducted 
within the area. Numerous subjects were stopped on car checks and ped checks, including 
several individuals with criminal pasts. A bait car was also set up with a laptop computer 
inside, and shortly after setup subjects were apprehended stealing the equipment. Bait 
was also set up on copper wiring in the CORE area, and two subjects were arrested 
stealing the wire. The amount of self-initiated activity within the area increased 
substantially during the period, and a corresponding drop in crime was noticed. It is 
unclear which of the numerous arrests might have been the most responsible for the 
positive impact in the region.  
 
During the process, the Community Services unit continued to work with the 
management of apartment complexes within the area in identifying and evicting problem 
residents.  
 
The resulting drop in crime was noticeable, not only by the department but by area 
residents. Officers will continue to focus upon this area to help keep crime and disorder 
to a minimum.  
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